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The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument |
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| 著者 |
Guha, Nirmalya (著)
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| 掲載誌 |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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| 巻号 | v.49 n.2 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2021.04 |
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| ページ | 257 - 289 |
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| 出版者 | Springer |
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| 出版サイト |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| キーワード | tādātmya; equality; identity; difference; Brahma¯nanda Sarasvatı |
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| 抄録 | Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators (upalakṣaṇa). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ (tādātmya). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.
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| 目次 | Abstract
Part A
Part B
Conclusion |
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| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10781-021-09467-0 |
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| ヒット数 | 97 |
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| 作成日 | 2022.12.30 |
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| 更新日期 | 2022.12.30 |
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