|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes In Population Ethics |
|
|
|
| 著者 |
Contestabile, Bruno
|
|---|
| 掲載誌 |
Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal
|
|---|
| 巻号 | v.11 n.1 |
|---|
| 出版年月日 | 2010.05 |
|---|
| ページ | 103 - 113 |
|---|
| 出版者 | Routledge |
|---|
| 出版サイト |
https://www.routledge.com/
|
|---|
| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
|---|
| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
|---|
| 言語 | 英文=English |
|---|
| ノート | Full text available from https://www.socrethics.com/Folder2/Paradoxes.htm |
|---|
| キーワード | Values (Ethics); Paradoxes; Ethics; Interest (Psychology) |
|---|
| 抄録 | Starting point The starting point of this paper is the following citation concerning the state of contemporary population ethics:
Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations ‘is better than’ and ‘is as good as’. This field has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. (Arrhenius 2004, 201)
Type of problem
The best known and most discussed example shattering our intuitions is Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. This paper explores the potential of the Buddhist Truths to answer the following questions: What is at the source of the Mere Addition Paradox? and Why are paradoxes unavoidable in population ethics?
Results The comparison of classical utilitarian and Buddhist intuitions demonstrates the close tie between intuitions and interests. The perplexing Buddhist intuition about non-existence can be explained (except for metaphysical reasons) by a radically different priority given to survival. The method of measuring the quality of life is not decisive for the existence of paradoxes; the Buddhist axiology changes but does not remove counter-intuitive combinations. If the conflict of interest (quantity versus quality) is described within a two-parameter model, it causes conflicting intuitions; in axiologies that favour quantity (utilitarianism) or quality (perfectionism), the conflicting intuitions inevitably lead to paradoxes. In order to find a compromise, one would have to find a universal interest and a corresponding universal intuition; the obvious candidate to meet this request is sympathy but, since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Breaking out of the two-parameter model and accepting the incommensurability of certain qualities threatens the normative claim of population ethics. |
|---|
| 目次 | Introduction 104
Starting point 104
The Mere Addition Paradox 104
Buddhism 105
The truths 105
The Reverse Repugnant Conclusion 107
Kinds of happiness 107
The preference for non-existence 108
Intuition and interest 109
Classical utilitarianism versus Buddhism 109
Quantity versus quality 109
Commensurability 110
The Impossibility Theorem 112
Conclusion 112
Acknowledgements 113 |
|---|
| ISSN | 14639947 (P); 14767953 (E) |
|---|
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/14639940903239819 |
|---|
| ヒット数 | 345 |
|---|
| 作成日 | 2011.03.17 |
|---|
| 更新日期 | 2022.05.17 |
|---|
 |
Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac)での検索をお勧めします。ＩＥではこの検索システムを表示できません。
|
|
|
