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Some Problems with Particularism |
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| 著者 |
Keown, Damien
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| 掲載誌 |
Journal of Buddhist Ethics
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| 巻号 | v.20 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2013 |
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| ページ | 445 - 460 |
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| 出版者 | Department of History & Religious Studies Program , The Pennsylvania State University |
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| 出版サイト |
http://history.psu.edu
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| 出版地 | University Park, PA, US |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| ノート | Damien Keown, Goldsmiths College, University of London. |
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| 抄録 | This article suggests that due to a restricted understanding of the nature and scope of ethical theory, particularism discounts prematurely the possibility of a metatheory of Buddhist ethics. The textual evidence presented in support of particularism is reconsidered and shown to be consistent with a metatheoretical reading. It is argued that writers who have adopted a particularist approach
based on W. D. Ross’s “Principalism”—such as Tessa Bartholomeusz in her study of just war ideology in Sri Lanka—have failed to give a satisfactory analysis of the moral dilemmas they have identified. Although particularism rightly draws attention to stories as important sources of moral data, it fails to disprove that the diversity of such evidence can be explained by a single comprehensive theory. |
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| ISSN | 10769005 (E) |
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| ヒット数 | 297 |
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| 作成日 | 2014.07.14 |
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| 更新日期 | 2017.07.13 |
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