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Three Ways of Denying the Self |
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| 著者 |
Jones, Dhivan Thomas
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| 掲載誌 |
Western Buddhist Review
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| 巻号 | v.7 |
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| 出版年月日 | 2020 |
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| ページ | 19 - 44 |
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| 出版者 | Triratna Buddhist Order |
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| 出版サイト |
https://thebuddhistcentre.com/
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| 出版地 | London, UK [倫敦, 英國] |
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| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| 抄録 | Buddhist philosophers have tried to work out the implications of the Buddha’s teaching of non-self (anattā). I characterise the teaching of non-self in the Pāli discourses, noting that, although the Buddha denied the existence of a ‘metaphysical’ self, he did not completely deny the ‘everyday’ self but presupposed the ‘I’ as a continuously identical moral agent. I go on to explain three attempts to explain the Buddha’s teaching. (1) Nāgasena in the Milindapañha uses the chariot argument to show that the self, like a chariot, is a conventional designation for a functional arrangement of parts. (2) The Yogācāra philosopher Vasubandhu argues that the self is a cognitive mistake and that in reality there is only non-dual awareness. (3) The Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti argues that there is the appearance of a self but it does not exist in the way that it appears. I conclude that these ways of denying the self are distinct and that Candrakīrti’s way seems closest to the Buddha’s as recorded in the Pāli canon. |
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| 目次 | INTRODUCTION 19
THE CHARIOT ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE SELF 26
VASUBANDU’S ARGUMENT THAT THE SELF IS A MISTAKE 31
CANDRAKĪRTI’S DIALECTICAL DENIAL OF THE SELF 36
WHY I THINK CANDRAKĪRTI HAS GOT IT RIGHT 41
REFERENCES 42 |
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| ISSN | 13577581 (P) |
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| ヒット数 | 117 |
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| 作成日 | 2021.03.20 |
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