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先驗邏輯與精神發展-陳那與康德批判知識論的研究=Transcendental logic and spiritual development in Dignāga's and Kant's critical epistemology |
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| 著者 |
汪純瑩 (著)=Wang, Chun-ying (au.)
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| 出版年月日 | 2017 |
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| ページ | 258 |
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| 出版者 | 國立政治大學 |
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| 出版サイト |
https://www.nccu.edu.tw/
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| 出版地 | 臺北市, 臺灣 [Taipei shih, Taiwan] |
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| 資料の種類 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
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| 言語 | 英文=English |
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| 学位 | 博士 |
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| 学校 | 國立政治大學 |
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| 学部・学科名 | 哲學系 |
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| 指導教官 | 林鎮國 |
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| 卒業年 | 104 |
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| キーワード | 自由=Freedom; 自證=Self-awareness; 形式因果=Formal causality; 認識論=Formal causation; 康德=Epistemology; 先驗觀念論=Kant; 自我意識=Transcendental idealism; 陳那=Dignāga; 中觀=Madhayamaka; 瑜伽行派=Yogacārā; 識論=Pramāṇa-vāda |
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| 抄録 | 佛家哲學與康德哲學不約而同地要求著我們一方面必須被限制在制約著一切可能現象的自然因果律當中，卻又同時要求著我們可以從這個制約當中追尋精神上的解脫。這個不相容卻又互為需要的一種特殊依存關係，在佛家，我們有「輪迴」與「涅槃」；在康德，我們有「自然」與「自由」。康德堅信先驗認識論是解釋這個關係的必要途徑，但是這個立場顯然難以輕易為後人所理解，以至於直到現在哲學家們仍然必須很努力來為康德辯護。另一方面，佛家哲學探討認識論是否構成恰當的手段來釋開這個關係，而不同的看法導致大乘佛教分裂為中觀學派與瑜伽行學派，而中觀學派又分裂為自續與應成兩派。
在康德學與佛學傳統中對知識論的一般理解，因為傾向于將認知系統理解為本體地運作在時間當中，於是導致上述難題不易辨清。本文嘗試展示對知識論的本體價值預設是理解康德先驗觀念論的障礙，也造成知識論，特別是陳那所提出的反實在論知識論，在佛家解脫計劃中地位未定的原因。本文也嘗試透過解除對認知系統的本體論預設建立本文所謂的「批判知識論」，進而分別地在兩個傳統中為知識論的地位辯護。這包含著我們在自然因果關係之外，還需要一個另外的他種因果關係（自由的因果），不論就文獻來說，或者就哲學系統來說。自由因果只確立認知的因與一切可能認知之間的關係，而自然的因果只在認知的結果之中有效卻不可能對認知的因有效。雖然這兩種因果關係彼此獨立地作用，它們在所有可能認識的實現之中形成一個形式的統一。這兩種因果關係的正交，明確地將一個個人的自由狀態（反身地正在認知中）與被限制狀態（反身地被認知）區分開來； 更甚，其空內積，也就是這兩種因果關係對彼此的無效，造就了一切可能被實現的認識之中，「理想」與「現實」這兩個向量空間的可能性， 也因此拱起了一個單一的「經驗」世界。
In Buddhism and in Kant, there exists a common quest for an incompatible yet harmonious mutual dependence between the constraining of all possible phenomena within the bounds of natural causality and the spiritual liberation from such causal chains: saṃsāra vs. nirvāṇa in Buddhism and nature vs. freedom in Kant. Kant believes that transcendental epistemology is necessary to resolve
said paradox, and this position has proven so incomprehensible for later thinkers that
philosophers nowadays still feel compelled to defend Kant. Meanwhile, in Buddhism,
debates continue to rage on whether epistemology constitutes a proper means to
explain the dependence, and such debates have resulted in the split of Mahāyāna Buddhism into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, and subsequently Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prasaṅgika.
The mainstream understanding of the epistemology in the philosophical traditions of Kant and Buddhism is problematic because the cognitive system is understood to be operating ontologically in time. I shall attempt to demonstrate that the ontological assumption in the mainstream understanding is the root cause for both the difficulty in appreciating Kant's transcendental idealism and the indeterminable position of epistemology in Buddhism, especially Dignāga's anti-realistic epistemology. I will also defend epistemology by denying the ontological attribution to the epistemic system and by establishing what I term “critical epistemology.” This entails focusing on the need for an additional, distinct kind of causality (causality of freedom) on top of the natural causality in both traditions, be it textually or philosophically. The causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition and its relation to all cognitions, whereas the causality of nature is only effective in the results of cognition but never on the cause of cognition. Although the two kinds of causality operate independently, they constitute a formal unity in the realization of every possible cognition. The orthogonality between the two kinds of causality sharply distinguishes the free (reflexively cognizing) status from the constrained (reflexively cognized) status of a person; furthermore, its empty inner product, i.e., the empty impact these two kinds of causality exert upon each other, makes sense of each vector subspace (dimension), namely ideality and reality, in all possible realized cognitions, thus culminating in a single world of “experience.” |
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| 目次 | 1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Problems and General Ideas of the Investigation 1
1.2 Analyses of the Problematics 11
1.3 Backgrounds of the Problems 20
1.3.1 Background in Buddhism 20
1.3.1.1 Two Truth Theory in Buddhism 20
1.3.1.2 Probability for Critical Epistemology in Buddhism – Especially with the Clues in Chinese Commentaries 31
1.3.2 Kant: Critical Epistemology and Transcendental Idealism 42
2 The Problem of Kant's Third Antinomy on Freedom 51
2.1 The Problem of the Third Antinomy 56
2.2 Realistic Presentation of the Thesis and Two-World Reading of Its Modification of Transcendental Idealism 63
2.3 Kant's Proposal. Transcendental Idealism as the Resolution to the Antinomy, Two-Aspect Reading and Support from Critical Epistemology 73
3 Dignāga in the Middle of the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra Conflict, Especially on the Issue of Causality 83
3.1 Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka Worries about Absolute Causes in Relation to His Project of Practice 92
3.2 Plural Vasubandhus and Dignāga 105
3.3 Yogācāra Dignāga and the Epistemological Turn in Buddhist Philosophy, Especially Regarding the Non-temporality of Cognitive Causality and the Allowability for a Holistic Model of Epistemology in Contrast to Proceduralistic Model in Time 113
4 The Ontological Neutralism in Dignāga's Epistemology – Critical Reconstructive Interpretation of Related Passages in NMukh and PS(V) 121
4.1 The Two Pramāṇa-s 121
4.2 Formal Conformity between Pramāṇa and Prameya 126
4.3 Twofold Appearance 132
4.4 The Claim about Self-awareness: Pramāṇa, Prameya and Phala Are Not Separate from One Another 147
4.5 The Holistic Argument for Mental Perception from Verse 6 on 158
4.5.1 Valid Cognition Is Holism 158
4.5.2 Exhaustive Analysis of All Kinds of Mental Perception and Pseudo-mental Perception 160
4.5.3 Mental Awareness Is Self-evident (Perceptual) 165
4.5.4 Appendix. Explanation for the Twofold Appearance in the Demonstrative Fact of “Recollection” 168
4.6 Appendix. Jinendrabuddhi – The Difficulty in the Sharp Distinction between the Object-aspects in Accordance with the Two Pramāṇa-s 174
5 Conclusion 199
5.1 Freedom and the World. General Review of the Critical Understanding of Kantian and Buddhist Epistemology 199
5.1.1 Freedom and Phenomenal Causal Exhaustion – West (Kant) and East (Buddhism) 199
5.1.2 Defending Kant's Transcendental Idealism on Freedom in the Thesis of the Third Antinomy 202
5.1.3 The Madhyamaka-Yogācāra Conflict 204
5.1.4 The Epistemological Situation Talks 205
5.1.5 Conclusive Remark 208
5.2 Freedom and Hope. Practical Goals/Consequences of Doing Critical Epistemology 209
5.2.1 Radical Evil, Banal Evil and Responsibility in Light of Critical Epistemology 209
5.2.2 Nirvāṇa as One Necessary Possibility for Awareness to Get Rid of Phenomenal Causal Exhaustion and the Goal of Cultivation in Buddhism 215
5.2.3 Rejection of the Experience of Non-Conceptual Perception: A Tentative Response to Arendt's Pardoning Eichman 218
5.2.4 Conclusive Remark 222
5.3 Logic and Spiritual Development 222
5.3.1 Transcendental Logic Is Epistemological Logic, Whose Structure Is Necessarily Coined and Expressed in All possible Phenomena via Cognition/Self-cognition 222
5.3.2 Inference vs. Dialectics of reductio ad absurdum 228
5.3.3 Logic and Practice: The Same Logic, but Different Employments. 231
Bibliography 234
Summary 245 |
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| ヒット数 | 181 |
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| 作成日 | 2022.06.24 |
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| 更新日期 | 2023.02.17 |
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