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有形象認識論の形象は非真実か?=Are Cognitive Images Unreal in the Theory of Sākārajñāna? |
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著者 |
片岡啓 (著)=Kataoka, Kei (au.)
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掲載誌 |
印度學佛教學研究 =Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies=Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū
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巻号 | v.67 n.1 (總號=n.146) |
出版年月日 | 2018.12.20 |
ページ | 374 - 367 |
出版者 | 日本印度学仏教学会 |
出版サイト |
http://www.jaibs.jp/
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出版地 | 東京, 日本 [Tokyo, Japan] |
資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
言語 | 日文=Japanese |
キーワード | Kamalaśīla; nirākāra; sākāra; satyākāra |
抄録 | When describing the sākārajñānavādipakṣa, i.e., the thesis of those who hold that cognition is endowed with images, Kamalaśīla explicitly states that manifold images (ākāra) are unreal (asatya) and not absolutely true (pāramārthika). His statement can be interpreted as a negation of the theory of citrādvaita common to the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras from the higher perspective peculiar to the Yogācāras, particularly in relation to the asallakṣanānupraveśopāya in which grāhya is denied. In other words, this statement should not be taken as an expression of the alīkākāravāda, i.e., the view that images are false. Therefore, we do not have to abandon our common presumption that the sākārajñānavāda is equivalent to what is later called satyākāravāda. Kamalaśīla’s statement is acceptable in the well-established framing of our theoretical understanding. The value of asatya can vary according to whether the contrast is between parikalpita and paratantra, or between paratantra and pariniṣpanna. The issue that Funayama 2007 raised can be solved in this way. Otherwise, we would have to completely give up our common understanding, because what Kamalaśīla calls sākārajñānavāda would correspond to the alīkākāravāda. |
目次 | 問題の所在 374 形象論の分類 373 勝義=真実 373 真実 vs 虚偽 372 カマラシーラの言明の意図 370 真実・勝義のレベル 369 結論 369 |
ISSN | 00194344 (P); 18840051 (E) |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.67.1_374 |
ヒット数 | 39 |
作成日 | 2022.08.11 |
更新日期 | 2022.08.11 |
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