Vijnana=Perception; 因果=Cause and Effect=Causality=Causation; 佛教人物=Buddhist; 僧團=叢林=Monastic Community=Buddhist Community; 認識論=Epistemology; Abhidharma; Rang Rig; Indian Buddhism; Doctrine; Self-cognition
摘要
The dissertation explores the historical development of the Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition. The concept “self-cognition (svasamvedana )” refers to the reflexive nature of the human mind, which is also a main subject in modern psychology and the rapidly-growing field of cognitive science. My central thesis is that the Buddhist doctrine of self-cognition originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahāsāmghikas, an early Buddhist school established right after the first schism of Buddhist community. The doctrine then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogācārins.
Based on the primary sources in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit and Tibetan, I trace the origin of the doctrine of self-cognition back to the Mahāsāmghikas. In their discussion on the omniscience of Srota-āpanna, an initial stage of Buddhist sagehood, they admit that this omniscience and, consequently, the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities occur in a single moment. In their view, the mind is like a lamp: it illuminates other things while it also illuminates itself.
The dissertation then explores the subsequent development of this doctrine in a series of Buddhist scholars, including Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins. The Sarvāstivādins set forth a systematic refutation to the Mahāsāmghika doctrine in terms of causality, epistemology, soteriology, the relationship of self and other, the distinction between particular and universal, and supportive similes. The Sarvāstivādins also developed a reflective model, in which they saw self-cognition as possible only in multiple moments rather than in a single moment.
The Sautrāntikas developed their doctrine of self-cognition by synthesizing the views of their predecessors. They discussed self-cognition in a more epistemological context, and especially in a framework of successively arising moments of cognition. They conclude that only mental consciousness is endowed with the capacity of self-cognition.
The early Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition bears a strong mark of Sautrāntika influence, although it was modified by contact with the Yogācāra idealism. Dignāga was the first Yogācāra scholar to systematize a doctrine of self-cognition in his epistemological system. I argue, against several eminent contemporary scholars, that self-cognition is a separate type of perception for Dignāga. Finally, I introduce Dharmapāla's concept of the cognition of self-cognition, which signifies a further level of reflexivity of the mind.
