Ontology, Philosophy of Language and Epistemology in Buddhist Tradition: A Study of Dharmakirti's Philosophy in the Light of Its Reception in the Later Indo-Tibetan Tradition
This work focuses on the problem of universals and its epistemological implications in the Indo-Tibetan tradition. It is divided into two parts, the first centering around the problem of universals and the second dealing with epistemology proper. I first present it in relation to the ontology of the tradition, relating it to questions such as the concept of existence and the status of specifically characterized phenomena (svalaksana, rang mtshan). In the second part, I analyze the problem of universals per se, contrasting the anti-realism of Sa-pan and his followers with the Ge-luk-ba moderate realism. Finally, the third part examines the issue of universals in relation to the philosophy of language of the tradition. It is mostly an impressionistic description of the evolution of the apoha theory in India and Tibet. It also analyzes conflicting Tibetan views about the problem of concept-formation. Throughout this first book, I expose differences between the Sa-gyas' consistent refutation of real universals and the Ge-luk-bas' more compromising position, which does not exclude the possibility that certain real universals exist in dependence on their instances.
The second book examines Tibetan contributions to epistemology, once more differentiating between the two Tibetan traditions. First, using a genealogical method, I consider the development of the theory of perception, which is one of two forms of knowledge admitted by Buddhist epistemology. I distinguish Dharmak irti's view from that of later Indian and Tibetan interpreters. In particular, I show how the new epistemology developed by early Tibetan thinkers continues a movement begun in India. I also examine Sa-gya Pandita's reaction against this new epistemology and its significance.
The second part of the second book addresses the nature of valid cognition, investigating the various interpretations among Indian and Tibetan thinkers. Focusing on the textual ambiguities of Dharmakirti's presentation, I delineate the conflicting stands that Tibetan scholars have taken on the definition of knowledge. I also examine the significance of the restriction of knowledge to perception and inference. Finally, I consider the closely related problem of the epistemological status of language and scripture in the Buddhist tradition and conclude by examining the difficulties of systematic philosophy.
