The Mīmāṁsakas lay down a principle termed ekaprasaratābhaṅga to prevent the uddeśya-vidheya relation from being posited for a compound (samāsa). Constituent meanings of a compound, say A and B, must play the same role of either uddeśya or vidheya. It is impossible that A is uddeśya and at the same time B is vidheya.
Relying on the Mahāhāṣya ad P2.1.1, Kumārila explains ekaprasaratā from a view-point of sāmarthya (semantic connection) which is formulated by Patañjali: sāpekṣam asamarthaṁ bhavati. Kumārila considers ekaprasaratābhaṅga to be associated with sāmarthyābaāva (absence of semantic connection).
Later Mīmāṁsakas do distinguish between two levels, viz. one in which the meaning-cognition is obtained from a compound and the other in which a compound's uddeśya-vidheya relation is established on the basis of prāptāprāptaviveka-principle. For them, ekaprasaratābhaṅga does not necessarily imply sāmarthyābaāva.