Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyak?a (which is akin to manovijñāna) might relate to svasaṃvitti; how those related doctrines might be brought to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to svasaṃvitti) concerning pramā?aphala; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument for svasaṃvitti. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) svasaṃvitti reflects a perceptual or a constitutive understanding of self-awareness.
目次
The Perceptual Views of Brentano and Hume, the Constitutive View of Kant: A Contrastive Case Study 329 Candrakı¯rti on manovijn˜a¯na, Dharmakı¯rti on ma¯nasapratyaks:a: Some Issues Opened up by Digna¯ga 336 Prajn˜a¯karagupta on ma¯nasapratyaks:a, Dharmottara on prama¯n: aphala: Two Solutions to the Same Problem 341 Digna¯ga on prama¯n: aphala as svasam: vitti 343 Digna¯ga on Cognition’s ‘‘Being Contentful’’ (vis:aya¯bha¯sata¯) as What is Meant by prama¯n: a 350 Is Digna¯ga’s a Constitutive View of svasam: vitti? Bilgrami on the Supposed ‘‘Independence’’ of Perceptual Objects 355 Dharmakı¯rti’s sahopalambhaniyama Argument: Towards the Mode of Necessity 357 ‘‘Situated Thoughts:’’ One Possible Take on the Nature of Dharmakı¯rti’s Argument 364 Concluding with More on the Significance of Phenomenological Considerations: Ra¯makan:t:ha’s Critical Appropriation of svasam: vitti 369
