In their meditative practice, Buddhist practitioners are instructed to observe various different objects, which may vary depending on the type or stage of meditative practice they engage. Some of these meditative objects are mundane, but some are extraordinary. Now the question is: Do these meditative objects exist? If they do not, how is it possible for a meditator to observe them? This study is part of my larger research on the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects (asad-ālambana-jñāna) as developed among some major Buddhist philosophical schools. These schools provide us a great variety of interesting and forceful arguments for this concept, and, accordingly, they would treat meditative objects as nonexistent. In the current paper, I will examine the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika controversy on the cognition of nonexistent meditative objects. This controversy will enrich our understanding of the meditative practice itself and also its relationship with philosophical discourse.
