Author Affiliations: Sheng Yen Postdoctoral Fellow in Chinese Buddhism, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
關鍵詞
Yogācāra=瑜珈行派; Consciousness-only=唯識宗; Cheng weishi lun=《成唯識論》; Ming dynasty=明朝; Bhājanaloka=器世間
摘要
This paper examines how two Ming Dynasty philosophers, steeped in the Yogācāra and Huayan 華嚴 Buddhist traditions, engaged with the question of how the world is commonly shared. It describes the debates held in the sacred Wutai Mountains between a Yogācāra scholar, Zhengui 真貴, and a Huayaninclined scholar, Zhencheng 鎮澄, on the topic of what constitutes the shared “world of sensory experience” (Sanskrit: bhājanaloka; Tibetan: snod kyi ‘jig rten; Chinese: qi shijian 器世間). This paper provides detailed analyses of the theoretical positions of the two experts who vigorously disputed the question of how, given the Yogācāra premise of individual and multiple consciousness, sentient beings share common experiences of the world. The Wutai debates illustrate how and why the question of what constitutes our shared world mattered to Buddhist scholars in the politically fractured and intellectually fractious years of the latter Ming Dynasty. Zhencheng and Zhengui’s paradigmatic analyses paint a picture of a community of scholars grappling with textual and conceptual lacunae in the touchstone doctrine by drawing not only from Yogācāra, but from other systems of Buddhist thought, in this instance, the Huayan tradition.
Introduction 119 Section One: Yogācāra and Huayan doctrines of the same world 121 The same world according to Yogācāra tradition 122 The same world according to the Huayan tradition 125 The sensory world according to the Yogācāra and Huayan traditions 126 The sensory world according the Yogācāra doctrine 130 The sensory world according to the Huayan teachings 134 The crux of the disputes between Zhencheng and Zhengui 137 The three-part syllogism: Zhengui’s defense of the same-world, different manifestations 139 Section Two: The Wutai Debates—Zhencheng and Zhengui dispute the nature of the same world 142 Zhencheng’s defense of the same world according to the Huayan doctrine 142 Zhencheng’s critique of the light metaphor: Lamps are not perfect emitters of light 143 The example of the warring states of Qin and Chu 145 The example of the pebble removed from the mountain 146 The example of the millstone 146 Zhencheng on the nature of explicit consciousness 148 “There is naught but one worldly realm” 151 Zhencheng’s concession: This is not the Huayan view 154 The heart of Zhengui’s rejoinder to Zhencheng 155 Zhengui’s defense of the lamp metaphor 155 The mountain range: Does it belong to Chu or Qin? 156 The pebble removed from the mountain: Does it disappear? 157 The example of the lumberjack 158 Defending the disharmony between the Yogācāra and Huayan doctrines 158 Conclusion: On the (in)compatibility of the Yogācāra and Huayan view of the same world 162 Acknowledgement 165
