Author Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
摘要
On the shoulders of Saṃghabhadra (5th century C.E.) and D. M. Armstrong (1926–2014), this article presents a model of consciousness which is reflective and perceptual. It addresses tentative replies to criticisms of the higher-order perception (HOP) theory of consciousness, implications of this model for empirical cases, and issues pertinent to the Buddhist idea of non-self.
目次
I. Saṃghabhadra's Idea in Ny: A Very Brief Overview 703 I.1. Why reflexive self-cognition is not possible 703 I.2. A reflective model of consciousness 705 II. Armstrong's Introspective Consciousness: Buddhism Plug-in Installed 707 III. Further Remarks from the Buddhist Perspective 709 III.1. Higher-order "perception" 709 III.2. Causal, asymmetrical, and rational 711 IV. Conclusion 712