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利己與利他之矛盾與統合
作者 釋昭慧 (著)=Shih, Chao-hwei (au.)
出處題名 2016年「利他主義與菩薩思想」國際學術會議=2016 International Conference on "Altruism and Bodhisattva Thought"
出版日期2016.05
頁次17 - 32
出版者玄奘大學宗教與文化學系、中華民國關懷生命協會、財團法人弘誓文教基金會
出版者網址 http://www.hongshi.org.tw/index.aspx
出版地桃園市, 臺灣 [Taoyuean shih, Taiwan]
資料類型會議論文=Proceeding Article
使用語言中文=Chinese
附註項作者單位:玄奘大學社會科學院院長、宗教與文化學系教授兼系主任
Professor and Director, Department of Religion and Cultrre; Dean of College of Arts and Sciences, Hsuan Chuang University, Taiwan.
關鍵詞心理利己主義=Psychological Egoism; 心理利他主義=Psychological Altruism; 倫理利己主義=Ethical Egoism; 倫理利他主義=Ethical Altruism; 四句義=the Four Categories (of Beneficial Activity); 實然=Descriptivism; 應然=Prescriptivism; 緣起=Dependent Origination; 護生=Protecting Life
摘要倫理學上有關「利己主義」與「利他主義」的論辯,將「利己」與「利他」視作不相容的命題(A 或-A),這顯然是依循傳統邏輯的「矛盾律」與「排中律」──人不可能「利己」而又「利他」;人不是主張「利己主義」,就是主張「利他主義」。
然而「利己」與「利他」,並非不能相容的 A 與-A,依佛家的「四句義」加以解析:
1. 有些行為既不利己,也不利他。
2. 有些行為雖能利己,但不利他。
3. 有些行為雖不利他,但能利己。
4. 有些行為既能利他,又能利己。
其次,即便能證明「利己」心理的存在,吾人亦難據此推論:「人們應該滿足利己心理。」亦即:「實然」的現狀並不足以證明「應然」,反之,「應然」經常是超越「實然」的一種實現目標。
而「己」或「他」,只是相對穩定的個體覺知,所產生的彼此區隔,一旦如實正觀「緣起」,即能洞燭「我相」與「他相」虛幻不實,而成為證悟「無我」的聖者。

The argument in ethics relating to “egoism” and “altruism” is that selfishness and selflessness are incompatible, “either-or" possibilities. This clearly follows upon the traditional logic of “the law of contradiction” and “the excluded middle” -- individuals cannot be selfish while being selfless; if someone is not taking the position of egoism, they are taking the position altruism.
However, according to the logic of Buddhism, it is actually not impossible for self-oriented and other-oriented actions to be compatible:
1. Certain actions are not beneficial to oneself, nor are they beneficial to others
2. Certain actions are beneficial to oneself, but not beneficial to others
3. Certain actions are not beneficial to others, but are beneficial to oneself
4. Certain actions are beneficial to oneself and beneficial to others
Further, even though we can confirm the possibility of self-beneficial states of mind, it is difficult for us to move from that confirmation to say that everyone should develop a self-beneficial state of mind. That is, the descriptive scenario is not sufficient to justify a prescriptive order. On the other hand, prescriptivism sets a goal that often goes beyond what descriptivism can accomplish.
“Self” and “other” just refer to the relatively stable condition of individual observers. If one is able to correctly observe things as they are, that is, as “dependently originated,” the apparent separation between self and other will be revealed to be illusory, unreal. One can then become a realized person who has awakened to “no-self.” Thus, “helping oneself” and “helping others” are not contradictory at a fundamental level, to the extent that the two can be mutually accomplished, and reconciled. The Buddha contemplated the actual state of things through dependent origination, and for the benefit of others created a bridge from selfishness to selflessness.
目次一、前言 20
(一)從「心理利己」的實然原理,建構了「倫理利己」的應然法則 20
(二)從「心理利他」的實然原理,架設了「倫理利他」的應然法則 21
二、「利己主義」與「利他主義」之正反論述 22
(一)「心理利己主義」與「倫理利己主義」 22
(二)「心理利他主義」與「倫理利他主義」 25
三、「利己」與「利他」之相互證成 26
四、「利己」與「利他」之四句料簡 29
五、「非己」與「非他」之緣起洞觀 30
六、結語 31
點閱次數368
建檔日期2020.08.13
更新日期2020.08.13










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