バルトリハリ著『ヴァーキヤパディーヤ』「関係詳解章」（52-88）とディグナーガ著『三時の考察』の比較研究(2)=A Comparative Study of Bhartrhari’s Chapter of “Saṃbandhasamuddeśa” (Verses 52-88) in the Vākyapadīya and Dignāga’s Traikālyaparīkṣā (2)
In this essay, I compare the first half of Bhartṛhari’s Chapter of “Saṃbandhasamuddeśa” and Dignaga’s Traikālyaparīkṣā to identify similarities and differences in their thought contained in those verses. First, Bhartṛhari, in verses 52 to 58, discusses the falsity of linguistic cognition and the cognitions through sense-organs, and the purity (śuddhi) of the cognition distinct from the falsity. Next, in verses 59 to 71, Bhartṛhari introduces the falsity of existence and non-existence at the relative level (saṃvṛti) and the truth of the absolute existence (paramārthasatya) distinct from these two. In verse 72, Bhartṛhari then explains the transcendence (atiśaya) of the elements (mātrā) of cognition from false imaginations (vikalpa) and in verse 73 the relativity of universal and individual. Meanwhile, Dignaga begins his verse with the concept of the non-existence of self-nature of the ¯ beings (dharma) in three time periods. Dignaga’s verses 2 to 7 correspond with Bhartṛhari’s verses 52 to 58, and Dignaga’s verses 8 to 19, with Bhartṛhari’s verses 59 to 71. However, Bhartṛhari’s verses 52, 64, 72, and 73 have no correspondence in Dignaga’s verses. By comparing the first half of Bhartr˚ hari’s Chapter of “Sam. bandhasamuddesa´ ” and Dignaga’s Traikālyaparīkṣā, we can see that Bhartr˚ hari’s standpoint that the multifold linguistic cognition and cognitions that have forms, such as cognitions through sense-organs, are false is similar to that of Mahayāna Buddhism. Bhartṛhari’s understanding that there is truth that transcends both existence and non-existence is also Buddhistic. Bhartṛhari, however, differs from the Buddhist standpoint in that he believes the ultimate existence (paramārthasat) which transcends relativity (saṃvṛti) is individual and has no-relation with others. For Buddhists, the teaching of dependent origination applies to all dharmas. Logically speaking, therefore, Buddhists accept that both true existence and false existence are recognized as certain existences which compose this world and they are somewhat related with each other through dependent origination. I believe that the reason that Dignaga begins his verses with the statement that the existences of three time periods have no self-nature is to demonstrate his affirmation of this fundamental Buddhist standpoint.
