This article is a critical edition and an annotated Japanese translation of the latter half (kk. 1809–1855) of the 21st chapter (Traikālyaparīkṣā) of the Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) by Śantarakṣita and Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (TSP) by Kamalaśīla, which follows my previous paper (Shiga[2015b]). The portion that I edit and translate here contains the following subjects: (1) the theory of activity (kāritra) claimed by Saṃghabhadra and the criticism against it (TS 1809–1819), (2) the relation ship between things of the past and future and their capabilities for purposeful action/causal efficacy (arthakriyā) (TS 1820–1841), and (3) the refutations against the five grounds of the sarvāstivāda presented by the Sarvāstivādins (TS 1842–1855). In subject (1), Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the relationship between the definition of kāritra given by Sam. ghabhadra—“the capacity to draw an effect (phalākṣepaśakti)”—and a real entity. Although they once negate the kāritra because it is a conventional existence (sāṃvrta) or provisional entity (prajñaptisat), they come to consider kāritra (=phalākṣepaśakti) to be a real entity (vastu) or a particular (svalakṣaṇa) from TS 1809 onward, and they deny that things of the past or future have such capacities. They refute the assertion of the Sarvāstivādins, because it is impossible for plural contradictory properties to belong to a single entity. In subject (2), the authors mainly examine whether things of the past and future are momentary, and whether those things have arthakriyāśaktis. If they are momentary, it follows that things being at a certain past or future period would have indefinite plural time periods. If they are not momentary, on the other hand, it would result in a contradiction with the theory of kṣaṇabhaṅga. From TS 1834, the authors examine whether past and future existences have arthakriyāśaktis. It should be noted here that they formulate the proofs by reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) and its contraposition (prasaṅgaviparyaya) to lead the Sarvāstivādins to the undesirable consequence that past and future existences would be present ones. In subject (3), the authors individually criticize the five grounds for the sarvāstivāda presented in TS 1787–1789. We should notice here that the authors discuss whether past and future entities can be established as real ones by the existence of yogic cognition, and that they advance their original views in this portion (TS 1852–1855). They do not directly negate the existence of yogic cognition that comprehends past and future entities; rather, they partly accept it and try to search for another solution different from that of the Sarvāstivādins. The statements regarding yogic cognition are mentioned and examined again in the last chapter of the TS and TSP (Atīndriyārthadarśiparīkṣā). It is noteworthy that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla make a clear distinction between yogic cognition (=śuddhalaukikavijñāna or vikalpa) and the Tathāgata’s cognition (=samastakalpanājālarahitajñāna or nirvikalpajñāna) .
目次
I. はじめに 76 II. 翻訳にあたって 80 (a) テキスト校訂および訳出の際の基本方針(追加分) 80 (b) 今回訳出する箇所の各資料の位置 81 (c) TS/TSP 第21 章「三時の考察」(kk. 1785–1855) シノプシス 81 1.三世実有論とその論拠(TS1785-1789) III. Critical Edition (TSP ad TS 1809–1855) 84 IV. 和訳と注解(TSP ad TS 1809–1855) 100 2. 説一切有部による作用説とそれに対する批判 100 3. 存在(実在) と効果的作用 105 4. 三世実有論の五つの論拠に対する批判 116
