Madhyamakas always focus on the explanation of emptiness from the ultimate aspect and do not attend too much to the conventional truth. This situation results in the misunderstanding that Madhyamakas are nihilists. Thus, Bhāviveka develops his unique two truths theory. He utilizes the Second Ultimate Truth (Skt: paryāya-paramārtha; Tib: mthun pa'i don dam)--for example those inferences for explaining the view of emptiness and refuting the assertions proposed by the opponents--to bridge the gap between the two truths and acknowledges that things are inherently existent in the conventional truth such that the use of inference has a proper foundation. However, in the appendix of Prajñāpradīpa, Bhāviveka specifically mentions that even hetuvidyā itself is empty in the ultimate truth in order to clarify the metaphysical doubt. Then, does his effort successfully resolve the difficulties? Is his theory of two truths reasonable? How does the Second Ultimate Truth play an apposite role in the stages of hearing (śrutamayī), thinking (cintāmayī) and practicing (bhāvanāmayī). This paper will elucidate Bhāviveka’s theory of two truths in a precise manner from the study of his own works such as Prajñāpradīpa, Jewels in the Hand (*Karatalaratna) and Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārika and Dharmapāla’s work such as Ta-Ch’eng Kuang Pai-Lun Shih (*Catuḥ-śataka-vṛtti) to comprehensively explain how it works as a whole.
