Bhāsarvajña の知覚 (pratyakṣa) の考察 — NBhūṣ p. 94, 08–p. 104, 04 の和訳 (承前)=Bhāsarvajña’s Discussions of the Characteristics of Pratyakṣa (Continued) — Annotated Japanese Translations of Nyāyabhūṣaṇa p.94,08-p.104,04
This paper contains an annotated Japanese translation of NBhūṣ p.94,08-p.104,04, which consists of the following three parts. 1. Buddhist refutation of Naiyāyika’s ‘indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannam’ (—continued topic from my previous paper—), followed by Bhāsarvajña ’s theory of prāpyakārin (the theory of the sense organs’ being effective only when they reach and have direct contact with their objects). 2. Some interpretations of the terms ‘avayapeśya’ (not to be defined by any word) and ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ (of the nature of settled determination) in NS 1.1.4., followed by Bhāsarvajña’s own. 3. The variety of pratyakṣa. Among the above-mentioned contents, one of the noteworthy views is Bhāsarvajña’s own interpretation that ‘avayapeśya’ and ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ suggest nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa and savikalpaka-pratyakṣa respectively. Almost same view is well known, being proposed in NVTṬ as that of Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspatimiśra. Interestingly enough, some relations between Trilocana and Bhāsarvajña may be possibly suspected. As another noteworthy point, I would like to mention Bhāsarvajña’s relentlessly critical stance against the Buddhist logicians. Regarding the variety of pratyaksa, he, at first, rejects Buddhist ‘mānasa’ (cognition through manas) and ‘svasaṃ vedana’ (self- cognition) as a pratyakṣa. On the other hand, at the end of this section, he invites Buddhist criticism that if ‘indriyārthasambandha(/saṃnikar.sa)’ is actually, as Naiyāyikas maintain, sādhakatama (the means of knowledge), the sense organs should have to cognize all the dharmas residing in the dharmin at the same time when the dharmin cognized. Bhāsarvajña, who is thoroughly versed in Buddhist logic, replies in tit-for-tat that such a ridiculous result could be occurred only in the Buddhist assertion that dharma (property) and dharmin (property-possessor) are not differentiated. As we have seen at the beginning, Bhāsarvajña disproves Budddhist refutation against Naiyāyika’s ‘indriyārthsaṃnikarṣotpannam’ to defend his own theory of prāpyakārin. In this way, when we look totally at his discussions, we cannot help but recognize Bhāsarvajña’s open hostility against the Buddhist logicians. As a matter of fact, a series of seemingly modest discussions here are only a prelude to the coming large-scale polemics that cover up to over 50 pages of the text.
