The overall thesis of this dissertation may be summed up as the position that Mawlāna Rūmī and Nāgārjuna both eschew any and all epistemological positions (beliefs) so as to abandon any and all ontological positionality (being). To this end, my argument is arranged into two chapters dealing respectively with these two authors. In the chapter on Rūmī, following a review of the relevant Western and Persian literature (2.2.), and prior to diving in to Mawlānā’s disavowal of any and all self-positionedness, I firstly focus on nationalist positions through an examination of some of the ways in which various exclusivist nationalist interests have competed, and continue to compete, to appropriate Mawlānā for ends quite anathematic to his own ecumenical/multivalent approach (2.3.1.). I thus attempt to demonstrate that, far from giving voice to any specifically Persian or Iranian nationalist identity, Rūmī and his poetry have been appropriated by not only Iranian but also Afghan and Turkish nationalist discourses as means to assert their own ideological agendas. I then take a closer look at Mawlānā’s own conceptualization of identity (2.3.2.). Drawing on selected passages from the Masnavī, I attempt to demonstrate that Jalāl al-Dīn’s notion of identity, particularly of the nationally-constituted kind, remains steadfastly untied to sectarian affiliations, and thereby undermines the appropriative nationalist efforts adumbrated theretofore. In succeeding sections, I develop the bulk of my argument by examining the means whereby Mawlānā Rūmī develops his own mode of discursive instability so as to reject positionality of any kind. Following a survey (2.4.1.) and critique (2.4.2.) of existing theoretical elaborations of apophasis as inadequate to Rūmī’s case , I specifically study the multiple authorial identities enacted by Rūmī in his eponymous Masnavī to negate his own affirmations, and thence even those negations, in multifolded dynamism, and thereby convey the paradoxical truth of self-subsistence in self-annihilation (baqāʾ andar fanāʾ) by which to disavow any self’s, and any belief’s, bids at self-assertion through self-definition. Rather than speaking through kataphatic avowal, logical demonstration, or doctrinal proclamation, Mawlānā adopts apophatic discursive strategies – whereby he speaks through negation (2.5.1.) , negation of negation (2.5.2.) and, ultimately, the negation of all binary affirmations and negations in multifolded dynamism (2.5.3.) – so as to deny the ego the definitive affirmation it seeks. By thus elaborating a fully fleshed-out investigation of the dynamic interplay of personified presence and authorial absence at work in the Masnavī, I develop an original understanding of this mystic’s highly charged and profoundly ambiguous relationship to his own subjectivity, and thereby to any subjectively affirmed doxastic position. We will thus see that Mawlānā eschews even his own belief system as, ultimately, inadequate in the face of what I call the constitutively polylectic nature of reality (2.6.). In so doing, I provide a Sufi perspective on the issue of identity that both challenges prevailing intellectual presuppositions and opens the way for a further appreciation of Rūmī’s unique contribution to Persian literature. As such, it is my hope that the ultimate conclusions of this chapter provide an alternative approach to the scholarly study of mystic poetics, while shedding light upon the various masks of identity itself. My concern in the chapter on Nāgārjuna is with his efforts to express ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) in the conventional garb of language (vyavahāra-satya or saṃvṛti-satya). I focus on Nāgārjuna’s use of the catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma in his major work, the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā) to make a number of inter-related propositions. Put briefly, I interpret the Nāgārjunian catuṣkoṭi to constitute an exhaustive and tetrāletheic āssertion aimed at “the aband
