This paper explores the ontology of early Mādhyamaka philosophy in China, and seeks to establish the possibility of deriving ethical implications from it. The Chinese Mādhyamika adopted the Indian Mādhyamika standpoint that all phenomena are inherently empty. Besides highlighting the theories of dependent origination, non-self, the middle way and the two truths, they further placed special emphasis on non-duality and the right view of non-attainment. From the (Mādhyamaka) perspective of the non-duality of self and non-self, I firstly argue that there is no contradiction between conventional self and ultimate non-self; and on that basis, I seek to demonstrate that non-self is in no way contradictory to the ethically engaged subject. Then, based on the implications of non-attainment, I employ the structure of the two truths to examine how the conventional self, through the ontology of emptiness, allows for an understanding of all dharmas and furthermore, how this serves to deepen nonattachment and enhance the subject's ability to maintain an attitude of non-attainment with respect to the self, others and the world. Apart from arousing the intention to act, this attitude also causes a shift towards a certain ethical virtue, yet such a shift is possible only by way of a continuous return to the ontology of emptiness. Whilst approaching nirvana, the ethical practice of benefiting self and others similarly revolves around the structure of returning to the ontology of emptiness and ethical shift. This ＂ethical shift＂ is indeed a unique feature of the early Mādhyamaka philosophy in China.
