In the Buddhist Pram a school, perception is classified into four kinds: indriy apraty ak a, manovij ñ na, svasa vedana, and y ogip raty ak a. Among them, yogip ratyak a, a valid cognition of yogis, is a concept that is of necessarity for the understanding of omniscience of the Buddha. It has been a crucial topic of arguments in the history of Indian Philosophy. This paper examines the epistermological structure of yogip ratyak a explicated by Dharmak rti and his commentators. It also introduces their debates against Hindu M m kas and Naiy yikas. An issue of the debates is how yogip ratyak a fulfills the two conditions of perception: free from conceptual construction (nirvikalp aka) and non-erroneous (abhr nta). By way of taking account of the issue, my paper demonstrates that yogip ratyak a is perception.
目次
Ⅰ. 서언 9 Ⅱ. 수행자의 證知의 인식론적 구조 11 Ⅲ. 수행자의 證知에 관한 논쟁 13 1. 無分別性에 관한 논쟁 13 2. 無錯誤性에 관한 논쟁 17 Ⅳ. 결어 20
