With Xuanzang’s (玄奘602-664 C.E.) translations of the Nyāyamukha by Dignāga (480-540 C.E.) and of the Nyāyapraveśa by Śaṅkarasvāmin and with his own teachings and elaborations to his disciples, Indian Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā) was systematically, as a subject or science, brought into the Chinese context and somehow adapted in the Chinese tradition since then. The inquiry that in that distant land how this new science was interpreted, applied, and even transformed would, indeed, be interesting and important. However, how this science was interpreted, applied in India before and during Xuanzang’s staying there? In addition to Xuanzang’s legacies, Dharmapāla’s (530-561 C.E.) Cheng weishi baosheng lun (成唯識寶生論), in which he explicitly uses Buddhist logic to interpret and to argue for the doctrine of Consciousness-only and against his opponents, is a very valuable resource for us.
Cheng weishi baosheng lun, extant only in Chinese, is Dharmapāla’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s (4th to 5th century C.E.) classic Viṃśikā and its Vṛtti. However, unlike Viṃśikā, which is very popular, this work has been not well explored and even neglected. The reasons might be that there is no Sanskrit or Tibetan version, and many passages in the Chinese translation by Yijing (義淨) are difficult to be understood. Even though this text is obscure and sometimes ambiguous, it’s still worthy of our effort not only because of its complicated argumentation but also because of Dharmapāla’s significance in the history of Buddhist thought, especially in East Asia.
This paper will focus on Dharmapāla’s application of Buddhist logic in his Cheng weishi baosheng lun. Dharmapāla’s commentary, very different from Vinītadeva’s, specifically uses Buddhist logic (three-membered Indian syllogism) to interpret Vasubandhu’s arguments, and furthermore he summarizes the points with that same tool. After establishing the thesis, by pointing out that his opponents have fallacious means of refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa) or fallacious means of proof (sādhanābhāsa), which means that their statements of proof are defective in respect of the thesis (pakṣa), the reason (hetu), or the example (dṛṣṭānta), Dharmapāla formulates his effective rebuttal to the counterarguments. Case by case, this paper will explore Dharmapāla’s style of argumentation in his own text. And in the end, with respect to hetuvidyā, a reading of Viṃśikā in Dharmapāla’s eyes will be briefly addressed.
