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ダルモーッタラのdṛṣṭāntābhāsa論:apradarśitānvaya / apradarśitavyatirekaの場合=On apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka in Dharmottara’s Theory of dṛṣṭāntābhāsa
作者 児玉瑛子 (著)=Kodama, Eiko (au.)
出處題名 印度學佛教學研究 =Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies=Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū
卷期v.69 n.2 (總號=n.153)
出版日期2021.03.25
頁次834 - 831
出版者日本印度学仏教学会
出版者網址 http://www.jaibs.jp/
資料類型期刊論文=Journal Article
使用語言日文=Japanese
關鍵詞Dharmottara; dṛṣṭāntābhāsa; parārthānumāna; vaktṛdoṣa
摘要In Dharmakīrti’s logic, especially in parārthānumāna, the role of example (dṛṣṭānta) is to show three characteristics of the logical reason (hetu). Examples that cannot show them are classified as fallacious examples (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa). Dignāga recognizes ten types of fallacious examples in both similar examples (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) and dissimilar examples (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta). In Pramāṇaviniścaya ch. 3 and Nyāyabindu ch. 3, Dharmakīrti took over all of them, to which he newly added eight types. Apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka, the main topics of this paper, are contained in the new types, and are concepts peculiar to Dharmakīrti’s syllogism which consists of two members, namely vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā.

Apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka mean that a speaker presents only examples and does not state vyāpti in the syllogism of anvaya or vyatireka. In contrast to Jñānaśrībhadra and Vinītadeva, Dharmottara discusses apradarśitānvaya and apradarśitavyatireka positively, and makes two distinctive interpretations. Firstly, Dharmottara mentions the process of syllogism and sentence of vyāpti (as a member of the syllogism), and concludes that the purpose of examples is to elucidate the meanings of the sentences in anvaya or vyatireka, while depending on the understanding of vyāpti (as the relationship between sādhyadharma and sādhanadharma, i.e., avinābhāva etc.). Secondly, while clearly distinguishing parārthānumāna from svārthānumāna, he makes a clear statement that a speaker’s fault can be the fault of examples in parārthānumāna. Hence, in conclusion, I would like to point out the following: Dharmottara focuses on the distinction between real existence (vastu) itself and right or wrong in the proof which has not been touched by other commentators. Furthermore, he unfolds an interpretation that emphasizes the problem of a statement (vacana) and a form of proof, corresponding to the topic of parārthānumāna.
目次1.はじめに 834
2.ダルマキールティによる擬似喩例の分類 834
3.喩例は何を明らかにするのか 833
4.論者の過失は喩例の過失か 833
5.結論 832
ISSN00194344 (P)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.69.2_834
點閱次數63
建檔日期2022.11.22
更新日期2022.11.22










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