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The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument |
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| 作者 |
Guha, Nirmalya (著)
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| 出處題名 |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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| 卷期 | v.49 n.2 |
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| 出版日期 | 2021.04 |
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| 頁次 | 257 - 289 |
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| 出版者 | Springer |
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| 出版者網址 |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
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| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
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| 關鍵詞 | tādātmya; equality; identity; difference; Brahma¯nanda Sarasvatı |
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| 摘要 | Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators (upalakṣaṇa). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ (tādātmya). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.
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| 目次 | Abstract
Part A
Part B
Conclusion |
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| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10781-021-09467-0 |
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| 點閱次數 | 141 |
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| 建檔日期 | 2022.12.30 |
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| 更新日期 | 2022.12.30 |
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