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Nāgārjunian-Yogācārian Modal Logic versus Aristotelian Modal Logic |
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作者 |
Schumann, Andrew (著)
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出處題名 |
Journal of Indian Philosophy
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卷期 | v.49 n.3 |
出版日期 | 2021.07 |
頁次 | 467 - 498 |
出版者 | Springer |
出版者網址 |
http://www.springer.com/gp/
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出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
使用語言 | 英文=English |
關鍵詞 | Aristotle; Stoics; Chrysippus; logic; modal logic; Na¯ga¯rjuna; Madhyamaka; Yoga¯ca¯ra; nyāya |
摘要 | There are two different modal logics: the logic T assuming contingency and the logic K = assuming logical determinism. In the paper, I show that the Aristotelian treatise On Interpretation (Περί ερμηνείας, De Interpretatione) has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to T. In this logic, it is supposed that there are contingent events. The Nāgārjunian treatise Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtiḥ-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇa has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to K =. In this logic, it is supposed that there is a logical determinism: each event happens necessarily (siddha) or it does not happen necessarily (asiddha). The Nāgārjunian approach was inherited by the Yogācārins who developed, first, the doctrine of causality of all real entities (arthakriyātva) and, second, the doctrine of momentariness of all real entities (kṣaṇikavāda). Both doctrines were a philosophical ground of the Yogācārins for the logical determinism. Hence, Aristotle implicitly used the logic T in his modal reasoning. The Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools implicitly used the logic K = in their modal reasoning.
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目次 | Abstract Introduction Madhyamaka and Logic Some General Remarks on Modal Logic Some General Remarks on Translations of Logical Terms Aristotelian Modal Logic Logical Determinism and hetutā Nāgārjuna’s Intuition towards Modal Logic Conclusion References |
ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
點閱次數 | 98 |
建檔日期 | 2022.12.30 |
更新日期 | 2022.12.30 |


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