This study aims at clarifying how Buddhist logic was formed and what its characteristics is. In sūtras and commentaries of Early Buddhism, we see that the Buddha and for a long time after his death the other masters considered and criticised logic as a science of argumentation(takka) and casuistry(vīmamsā). Logic belonged to the secular sphere and was the domain of heathens. But since the various schools of Indian philosophy recurred to dispute for establishing their philosophy, logic was needed in Buddhist circles as well. Thus in the Yogācārabhūmi, logic(因明; Hetu-vidyā) was considered as a necessary item to be learned by Bodhisattvas. Afterwards, there were the efforts of Asanga and Vasubandhu, but they were not free from flaws. Logic as a Buddhist science was mainly formed by Dignāga. Dignāga has been known to scholars of Indian philosophy as the father of medieval logic in India. Especially, the advent of Dignāga in the history of Indian logic was a landmark so that Buddhist logic after Dignāga has been called New Hetu-vidyā. Dignāga himself composed three logical treatise of the Pramāna-samuccaya(集量論), Nyāya-mukha(因明正理門論) and Hetu-cakra-damaru. He established the theory of the three-membered syllogism(三支作法), the three characteristics of the middle term(因의 三相) and the theory of Nine Reasons(九句因). Dignāga's Buddhist logic was a product of a deep consideration of previous Buddhist logic and was also qualitatively different from it. Nyāya's logic firmly established the authority of the Veda by establishing the four pramānas of word or verbal testimony(śabda; 聖言量), inference(anumāna; 比量), perception(pratyaksa; 現量), comparison(upamāna; 比較量), and the five membered syllogism of proposition(prtijñā; 宗), reason(hetu; 因), example(udāharana; 喩), application(upanaya; 合), and conclusion(nigamana; 結). Nyāya's logic aims at making śabda as perception, and proof and acceptance of śabda. This puts the certainty of knowledge on śabda and thus the self-awakening of man has to be proven by śabda. On the other side, Dignāga considers śabda as name and language(名言) and as not different from anumāna, hence the certainty has to be proven by means of pratyaksa and anumāna. He refuted the theory of the four pramānas and the five membered syllogism of the Nyāya-school and asserted the two pramānas of pratyaksa and anumāna and the three syllogism of subject, mark, and example. pratyaksa differs into four kinds but it is explained by self-consciousness(svasamvedana; 自證). In the end, the certainty of knowledge is established through anubhava(覺受). Also, anumāna is defined as differential perception relying on language. Hence inference for one's own(svārtha-anumāna; 自比量) is relying on language is ascertained by means of three characteristics of the middle term, whereas inference for the sake of others(parārtha-anumāna; 他比量) as aiming at approbation of one's knowledge by others, is explained by the three membered syllogism. Therefore pratyaksa cannot be deemed as simply being sensory perception. Rather, it is valid knowledge obtained through investigation and eradication of erratic perception. This is termed as self-consciousness(svasamvedana). Also, anumāna is not simply ratiocinating knowledge resulting from the process of ratiocination, but a knowledge resulting of the three characteristics of the middle term. Here anumāna denotes a clear perception of those three characteristics.
目次
I. 머리말 3 II. 佛教理論의 成立 4 III. 佛教理論學의 特徵 15 IV. 結語 35
