針對非佛教的古代印度哲學家所理解並批評的證成唯識之因明論證，當代學者John Taber 認為這只是攻擊稻草人：(1) 過去應沒有任何有聲望的佛教哲學家認真地提出這樣的論證；(2) 該類論證明顯是錯的。 筆者藉著爬梳世親《唯識二十論》、護法《成唯識寶生論》等相關文獻，提出明確的文獻證據反駁Taber：(1) 實際上確有佛教哲學家（例如護法）提出證成唯識的因明論證，相關文獻顯示這種論證或解讀流傳於當時的印度與中國，年代至遲應不晚於護法。(2) 筆者也就論證形式來分析，這類的論證如何可能符合當時因明的形式要求，因而Taber 的論式批評或是錯誤、或是欠缺同情理解，更重要的，Taber 忽略了當時的陳那因明特色，導致其提出時空錯置的批評。文末筆者也試圖點出該類論證就當代哲學而言的可能意義。 希望本文的討論有助於彰顯《成唯識寶生論》或護法研究的價值，過去因為欠缺對《成唯識寶生論》及相關漢語文獻的研究，因此才會有像Taber 那樣明顯與歷史不符的主張，護法思想研究是這塊拼圖中的關鍵之處。推而言之，忽略了漢語文獻，印度佛教思想史就會遺漏了重要線索，導致顯而易見的錯誤。 Regarding the Indian syllogistic argument for consciousnessonly (vijñaptimātratā) formulated and criticized by non-Buddhist philosophers, John Taber thinks that Hindu philosophers were “attacking a straw man,” that is to say, (1) the argument was not “seriously put forward by any Buddhist philosophers of repute” and (2) the argument is “patently false.” This paper examines the materials from Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikāvṛtti, Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Viṃśikā-vṛtti, etc. and argues that Taber is wrong for the following reasons. (1) There were indeed Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmapāla, who formulated the formal arguments which are similar to non-Buddhist philosophers’ formulations. The evidence suggests that the earliest formal arguments for consciousness-only were put forward no later than the time of Dharmapāla. (2) It is shown that the Buddhist formal arguments can be valid according to the rules of inference during that period, i.e. Dignāga’s logic. Taber’s criticisms are simply incorrect, inadequate due to the lack of charitable interpretation, and anachronistic because he does not take into consideration the specific characteristic of Dignāga’s logic. Concerning the argument, this paper also points out the potential engagement between Buddhist philosophy and contemporary philosophy. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the study of Dharmapāla and show the value of his works. Taber has made an obvious mistake precisely because of the insuffi cient research on the pertinent Chinese materials, including Dharmapāla’s commentaries, which are crucial to the study of philosophy after Vasubandhu and Dignāga. In a more general sense, the case helps us realize that it is not possible to have proper understanding of the history of Indian Buddhist thought without relying on Chinese materials
