In Dharmakīrti’s logic, the example (dṛṣṭānta) is considered to be included in a logical reason (hetu) and is not defined as an independent component of a syllogism. Dharmakīrti emphasizes the “essential connection” (svabhāvapratibandha), that is, the causality (tadutpatti, etc.) of kāryahetu and the identity (tādātmya, etc.) of svabhāvahetu, as a characteristic of logical reason. While the example’s role is to specify the “essential connection,” some differences exist between the role of similar (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) and dissimilar examples (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta). Dharmakīrti develops Dignāga’s theory and ultimately eliminates the need for an example, including a similar example, whereas Dharmottara explains that a dissimilar example does not have to be an entity but must be stated. Dharmakīrti attaches great importance to understanding the “essential connection,” and his description of the example treats it as a systematic theory of inference (anumāna). On the other hand, Dharmottara tends to emphasize the form of proof, and his interpretation of the example is characterized by vestiges of debate before proof (sādhana) was integrated into a theory of inference.
