Bhāviveka (500-570 A.D.) chose a different approach from Buddhapālita (470-540 A.D.) and Candrakīrt (600-650 A.D.), applying an autonomous (svātantra) syllogism to interpret Madhyamaka's concepts. He adopted Dignāgā (480-540 A.D.) 's logic system (hetuvidyā) and applied the three-part syllogism method containing a proposition (pakṣa), a reason (hetu), and an example (dṛṣṭānta). Especially, he always added the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of "from the viewpoint of ultimate truth" to the inference. This idea of adding a qualification can also be found in Dignāgā's Nyāyamukha. For example, in verse XVII, we find: "One single object has many attributes (dharmas); and therefore a mark [used as definition] (nimitta) cannot be appropriate to all. Only when we exclude the other[cases], the expression [abhidhāna] follows [the object]." Dignāgā's system does not indicate clearly under what conditions this applies and how it is to be applied; therefore, it remains up for discussion whether Bhāviveka's approach, adding a qualification, is appropriate and what the object of qualification should be. Second, in his work, Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun (《大乘掌珍論》 , *Karatalaratna), Bhāviveka used illusions and sky flowers as positive examples (sapakṣa) in the following two inferences: Conditioned things are empty according to the ultimate truth because they are produced by causes and conditions. Just like illusions. Unconditioned things are not real (according to the ultimate truth.) because they are not produced like sky flowers. We must, however, examine whether this positive example can bear the rule of "excluding the pakṣa" (除宗有法) in order not to fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning, in the first case. In addition, it should be determined what the existence of unconditioned things is for him and what the purpose of using the sky flowers as an example is. Finally, Bhāviveka's commentary-Prajñāpradīpa, unlike Da Cheng Zhang Zhen Lun, is an interpretation of Nāgārjuna (150-250 A.D.)'s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The strength of the debate in this work is therefore somehow restrictive. Bhāviveka sought to interpret that work by transforming its content with the use of inferences, but it should be examined whether his method is reasonable by checking some of the contents in Chap.1 of Prajñāpradīpa.
