The Center for Comparative Philosophy & University Library
出版地
California, US [加利福尼亞州, 美國]
資料類型
期刊論文=Journal Article
使用語言
英文=English
附註項
HIDALGO, JAVIER: Associate Professor of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, USA.
關鍵詞
Buddhism; Buddhist philosophy; emergentism; philosophy of mind; reductionism
摘要
In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish between different kinds of emergentism in the contemporary philosophical literature and show that they fail to support Buddhist Personalism. I thus conclude that Buddhist Personalism is untenable if it’s committed to emergentism about persons. This paper also indirectly defends Buddhist Reductionism by showing that it has crucial advantages over Buddhist Personalism.
目次
Abstract 76 1. Introduction 76 1. Buddhist Reductionism, Personalism, and Emergence 77 2. Three Emergentist Interpretations of Buddhist Personalism 83 4. Objections 89 A. Causal Continuity and Belongingness 89 B. The Advantages of Buddhist Personalism over Buddhist Reductionism 93 6. Conclusion 95 Acknowledgments 95 References 95
