샹카라는 『바가바드기타』의 주제를 지혜의 길에서 찾는다. 그렇기 때문에 지혜와 행위를 결합해야 한다는 지행회통론에 대해서는 날카로운 비판을 행한다. 첫째, 크리쉬나에 의해서 지혜와 행위가 각기 다른 근기의 사람들을 위한 것으로 제시되었다는 것이다. 얼핏 회통적인 이중주제설(二重主題說)로 보이지만, 그렇지 않다. 이중적으로 설해진 두 가지 주제가 평등하다고 말하는 것은 아니기 때문이다. 둘째, 지혜가 행위보다도 더 우수한 것이라 주장한다. 그 근거로서 3.1에서 아르쥬나는 “만약 당신께서 지성이 행위보다도 더 우수하다고 생각하신다면”이라고 말했지 않느냐는 것이다. 그러나 아르쥬나의 질문을 가지고서 『기타』의 정설(正說)로 삼으려는 것은 설득력이 없다. 셋째는 5.2에 대한 주석에서 샹카라는 ‘행위의 포기 vs 행위의 요가’라는 쌍에서 ‘행위의 포기’를 다시 ‘자아를 아는 자 vs 자아를 모르는 자’로 세분한다. 이를 통하여 자아를 아는 자는 지복(至福)을 얻는 것이 가능하지만, 자아를 모르는 자는 지복을 얻을 수 없다는 것이다. 이는 5.2의 입장과는 정면에서 배치되는 논리이다. 결국 샹카라의 지행회통 비판은 『기타』의 본래 입장을 왜곡한 것이 적지 않음을 확인할 수 있었다.
Śaṅkara acknowledges only jñāna as the mokṣa-dharma. In the point of view, it is thought that the doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā, which emphasizes in no small measure karma or bhakti, has given a dilemma to him. Though the Bhagavadgītā suggested two paths/arts of karma and bhakti as well as jñana, the first target of criticism was karma. No wonder the jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda, which asserts that through the unification of jñāna and karma can achieve the mokṣa, was embraced generally by people before his age (and of course after him as well). I examined how Śaṅkara criticized the jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda and then whether his criticism has validity. At first, Śaṅkara criticized that in the Bhagavadgītā 3.3, Kṛṣṇa presented jñāna and karma for the people who have different readiness(根機, adhikāra) respectively. Therefore, he asserted that those two cannot be united/amalgamated each other. Nevertheless, his double-subjected theory cannot be called as samuccayavāda. Because saying that jñāna and karma are applied respectively is just a strategy for criticizing the samuccayavāda and it does not mean that he regards those two subjects are equal. Secondly, he claims that jñāna is superior than karma. He provides the verses in the Bhagavadgītā 3.1 in which can be read as “if you think that jñāna is superior than karma,” as a reasonable evidence of his opinion. However, it shows a logical fallacy. Because the question of Arjuna in that verse is not a uttarapakṣa(後論) or siddhānta(正說), but a mere pūrvapakṣa(前論) which would be denied by Kṛṣṇa. It is not persuasive because he tried to make a siddhānta of Bhagavadgītā based on the position of Arjuna, not Kṛṣṇa. Therefore, Against his opinion, in the Bhagavadgītā 3.3, Kṛṣṇa mentions that contending for superiority between those two is meaningless by saying “[perfection of] reflective person is made by jñāna-yoga, and [perfection of] yogins are made by karma-yoga”. Śaṅkara comprehends the difference in readiness as an unequal hierarchy, not the difference in preference/aim. According to him, the pair of ‘reflective person vs yogin’ transforms into ‘one who knows the truth vs one who does not know the truth’. His understanding is not only away from the fundamental purpose(tātparya) of Bhagavadgītā but also kind of obsession with readiness itself, and I rechristen such attitude as ‘readiness-ism’. Though I think ‘consideration of readiness’ is necessary and has educational value, the ‘readiness-ism’ should be differenciated with it because it is uninstructive/anti-instructive. Thirdly, Śaṅkara subdivides the readiness of ‘renunciation of karma’, which is occurred as a component in the pair of ‘renunciation of karma vs karma-yoga’ in the Bhagavadgītā 5.2, into ‘one who knows ātman vs one who does not know ātman’. After that, he says that one who knows ātman can achieve bliss, but one who doesn’t know cannot. It means that he stands against the stance of the Bhagavadgītā 3.3 in which asserts “Both renunciation [of karma] and karma-yoga are capable of achieving bliss.” Moreover, Bhagavadgītā even shows that “Of the two, karma-yoga is superior than renunciation of karma.” I understand that the first half of Bhagavadgītā 5.2 presents the fundamental purpose(tātparya) and the last half shows the method(upāya) for the purpose. Though jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda is the fundamental purpose of the Bhāga
目次
I 머리말. 192 II 지혜와 행위의 분리.196 III 지혜일원론(知慧一元論) 주장의 근거. 200 IV 행위의 포기와 행위의 관계. 208 V 맺음말. 217
