부정대상; 실유; 승의유; 자상적 존재; 자성적 존재; 자립논증파; 귀류논증파; Object of negation(dgag bya); bden par grub pa, don dam par grub pa; rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa; rang bzhin gyis yod pa; Svātantrika(dbu ma rang rgyud pa); Prāsaṅgika(dbu ma thal 'gyur pa)
摘要
본 논문은 쫑카파(Tsong-kha-pa)의 저서 <密意解明(dGongs pa rab gsal)>에 나타난 공성논증의 논파대상인 부정대상(dgag bya)을 고찰한다. 여기에서 그는 空性의 모순명제인 부정대상에 대한 이해가 없이는 공성에 대한 바른 견해를 얻을 수 없다라고 보기 때문에 자립논증파와 귀류논증파 두 학파간의 부정대상을 자세히 설명한다. 그 결과, 자립논증파에서는 심식에 현현함이 없이 대상 자체의 독립적 방식으로 주하는 것을 부정되어야 할 대상이라고 규정한다. 이에 반해, 귀류논증파에서는 언설분별의 識에 의지하지 않거나 그것에 의해 건립되지 않은 본래적 자성인 것을 我라고 하였고, 이를 부정대상이라고 지시하였다. 이 때, 제법이 심식에 의해 가립된 것이라는 점에서는 두 중관학파가 동일하지만, 세속적으로는 자성을 갖는 존재를 인정하는가 아닌가라는 점에서 견해를 달리한다. 그러나 이와 같은 세속유에 대한 견해적 차이에도 불구하고 두 중관학파는 심식과 관련없이 존재하는 독립적 자성의 존재를 부정대상으로 보는 점에서는 유사하다.
This paper aims at the investigation of the object of negation that is explained in Tsong-kha-pa’s Extensive Explanation of “Supplement to(Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”(Illumination of the Thought, dGongs pa rab gsal). The dGongs pa rab gsal is the commentary of Candrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle(Madhyamakāvatāra, dbu ma la 'jug pa). Tsong-kha-pa emposized first on the importance of indentifying what is negated in proving the emptiness. Because one can achieve the exact view of emptiness through understanding of the object of negation. It implies that without understanding what true establishment is, as well as how phenomena are apprehended as truly existent, the view of emptiness will definitely fall into fallacy. Furthermore, Tsong-kha-pa tried to get an exact idea of the object of negation by comparing the Consequence School(Prāsaṅgika, dbu ma thal 'gyur pa)’s to the Autonomy School(Svātantrika, dbu ma rang rgyud pa)’s. As a result, the Autonomy School asserts that to exist in the manner of an objective mode of abiding without being posited through appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness is to truly exist, or to be negated. On the other hand, the Consequence School claims that inherent existence that is an entity of phenomena not depending on or not posited through the force of another ― a subjective terminological conceptual consciousness ― is called the self that is the object of negation. These two schools’ opinions are similar in that the object of negation is established independently with no relation to the subjective perceiver and the emptiness can be achieved by negating it. But in the manner of establishment of conventional entities, these two school show different views. The Consequence School holds that phenomena do not inherently exist even conventionally and therefore, they negate inherent existence(rang bzhin gyis yod pa) or existence from the object's own side(rang ngo bos yod pa) or something exists by way of its own character(rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). They claim that existence by way of the object's own character, existence from the object's side, inherent exisence, ultimate existence(don dam par grub pa), true existence(yang dag par grub pa), and real existence(bden par grub pa) are synonymous and refute them all. Whereas the Autonomy School asserts that phenomena exist by way of their own character, exist from their own side, and inherently exist conventionally while negating true existence, ultimate existence, and real existence. Presenting two different views on conventional entities, these two Mādhyamika Schools coincide in trying to acquire emptiness through refuting the object of negation, that is, real existence.
目次
I 서론. 381 II 공성이해의 선수조건. 385 III 자립논증파의 부정대상. 387 IV 귀류논증파의 부정대상. 397 V 결론 403
