Buddhist philosophy; Chariot Argument; Candrakīrti; Madhyamakāvatāra; Milindapañha
摘要
The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared to a snake in its hole). In contrast to this misuse of the chariot argument, in MA 6.150–165 Candrakīrti uses the chariot argument as an allegory to enable the meditator to refute the basis of ego-identification in seven ways. Candrakīrti’s use of the chariot argument does not establish any theory about the self or not-self, but acts as a guide to meditation as part of philosophy as a spiritual practice with the goal of liberation.
目次
Abstract 453 Introduction 454 The Canonical Version of the Chariot Argument 456 The Chariot Argument in the Milindapañha 458 The Misuse of the Chariot Argument 461 Candrakīrti’s use of the Chariot Argument 462 Conclusion 469 References 471
