網站導覽關於本館諮詢委員會聯絡我們書目提供版權聲明引用本站捐款贊助回首頁
書目佛學著者站內
檢索系統全文專區數位佛典語言教學相關連結
 


加值服務
書目管理
書目匯出
Contradiction, Negation, and the Catuṣkoṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka
作者 Hu, Chih-chiang (著)
出處題名 Journal of Indian Philosophy
卷期v.52 n.1/2
出版日期2024.03
頁次1 - 20
出版者Springer
出版者網址 http://www.springer.com/gp/
出版地Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國]
資料類型期刊論文=Journal Article
使用語言英文=English
附註項Author Affiliation: National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
關鍵詞Catuṣkoṭi; Contradiction; Negation; Dharmapāla; Buddhist logic
摘要Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions.
目次Abstract 1
Dignāga’s Logic and viruddha 3
Dignāga’s Logic 3
Faults Pertinent to Contradiction 3
Another Thing to Note About viruddha 5
Non-opposition and Qualifications 5
Another Term Denoting Opposition and Two Kinds of Negative Usages 8
Are the Four Positions in the Negative catus. ṣko.tṭi Mutually Exclusive and Jointly Exhaustive? 10
Dharmapāla’s Counterarguments in the Negative Catuṣkoṭi: A Case Study 12
Buddhist Logic and the Theory of Consciousness-Only as Therapeutic Tools 17
References 19
ISSN00221791 (P); 15730395 (E)
DOI10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4
點閱次數51
建檔日期2024.04.15
更新日期2024.04.16










建議您使用 Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac) 瀏覽器能獲得較好的檢索效果,IE不支援本檢索系統。

提示訊息

您即將離開本網站,連結到,此資料庫或電子期刊所提供之全文資源,當遇有網域限制或需付費下載情形時,將可能無法呈現。

修正書目錯誤

請直接於下方表格內刪改修正,填寫完正確資訊後,點擊下方送出鍵即可。
(您的指正將交管理者處理並儘快更正)

序號
696458

查詢歷史
檢索欄位代碼說明
檢索策略瀏覽