Omniscience; Rhetoric; Reason; Santaraksita; Tattvasamgraha; Kamalasila; Tattvasamgrahapanjika; India
摘要
Focusing on Śāntaraksita's Tattvasamgraha and Kamalaśīla's Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (both ca. 750–800), this dissertation examines the structures of reason and persuasion that the authors use to defend their understanding of a Buddha's omniscience. The dissertation argues that while these Buddhist authors promote reason as the highest arbiter of belief, they also see reason as a dialectical and practical matter, in which what counts as rational is determined in part by the aims of the author and the audience addressed. This approach prompts the authors to employ a ‘sliding scale of analysis,’ according to which they consider themselves to be rationally justified in arguing from diverse and even contradictory metaphysical premises within the confines of a single work. Since metaphysics, for these thinkers, largely defines the contours of the theory of the perfection of wisdom, the diversity of metaphysical positions in the works results in a multiplicity of models of a Buddha's omniscience as well.
The authors' approach to reason resonates in many ways with that presented by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in their work on argument, La Nouvelle Rhétorique. For this reason, the dissertation employs categories from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work alongside more traditional Buddhist conceptions to scrutinize the arguments for omniscience in the two works. The dissertation proceeds through a close reading of the Indian texts, providing translations and analyses of the key passages concerning omniscience in the works. Attention is paid to the overall structure of the works, to the historical context in which the authors write, and to the question of the authors' motives in presenting their arguments. The study concludes that the arguments for a Buddha's omniscience in the two works are designed to bring judicious people into the Buddhist fold by convincing them that the doctrines of Buddhism may be justified by reason alone, even while affirming that reason is necessarily contextual.
