Is Enlightenment Possible? An Analysis of Some Arguments in the Buddhist Philosophical Tradition with Special Attention to the "Pramanasiddhi" Chapter of Dharmakirti's "Pramanavarttika"
The dissertation has two parts. Part I is a philosophy-of-religion-oriented examination of some Indian Buddhist arguments for the truth of the cornerstones of the Buddist world-view, the Four Noble Truths, and especially for the existence and attainability of the Buddhist summum bonum, enlightenment or nirvana.
Chapter 1 examines the problem of truth in religion in general and Buddhism in particular, and concludes that, historically, Buddhists have held that the Four Noble Truths correspond to actual states-of-affairs in the cosmos.
Chapter 2 traces the development and delineation of early Buddhist soteriology, then analyzes a number of arguments from the Pali tradition, where testimony and reason are less important in "proving" Buddhist assertions than is personal verification on the path. The "argument from experience" is considered and found to present numerous epistemological problems.
Chapter 3 examines critically a number of doctrines and arguments from the "classical" Sanskritic tradition. These include the path-structure and karmic theory of the Abhidharmakosa, the Saddharmapundar(')ikasutra's notion of the Buddha's ethical and pedagogical skill-in-means, Madhyamika arguments from the doctrine of emptiness to the truth of religious assertions, and other germane concepts, such as gotra, Tathagatagarbha, and omniscience.
Chapter 4 examines in detail the rational proof of the Buddha's religious authoritativeness attempted in the pramanasiddhi chapter of Dharmak(')irti's Pramanavarttika. Dharmak(')irti's chapter is basically an attempt to prove the Four Noble Truths. Suffering and origination are to be established chiefly by a refutation of mind-body materialism and vindication of interactionism. Cessation and path are to be established by a proof of the soteriological power of a direct realization of selflessness. Dharmak(')irti's arguments are sophisticated, but rest on assumptions, particularly about the mind, that are problematic.
Chapter 5 concludes that the Buddhist arguments are not conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt, while conceding that neither are they disproved, nor is the Buddhist vision without considerable value.
Part II is an annotated translation of rGyal tshab's Tibetan commentary on the pramanasiddhi chapter, from his rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed.
The Tibetan text of the pramanasiddhi chapter, and a Glossary, are appended.
