本論文旨在針對眾多研究月稱 Candrakīrti 的二諦說（satyadvaya）的論文中，未曾注意到或未曾詳細探究的若干問題點，加以進一步的檢討。本篇（下篇）重點放在月稱所主張的世俗諦與自性（svabhāva）之關連。依據月稱的陳述，世俗諦之確立與「有自性」一事，是密不可分的。因為無明凡夫誤以為事物有自性， 執此為真實， 佛陀乃說它不是真實的自性， 是「世俗諦」（saṃv?tisatya）。但相對於此，月稱也多次強調：「於二諦中都沒有自性。」如何整合地理解這二個立場，是本論文的出發點。由此疑問點出發，在分析檢視了《入中論》Madhyamakāvatāra-bhā?ya 及《明句論》Prasannapadā 等著作中，關於世俗諦設立基準的相關描述之後，筆者發現與「自性」有著二重面向關係的「世俗諦」，不論是在佛教真理論的建立或是修道論乃至教育論的施設上，都擔負極重要的功能。因此，筆者以為，與其從斷絕的角度來理解月稱的二諦說，不如從「它與勝義諦是相輔相成的」之動態（dynamic）立場來觀察，更能掌握其二諦說的精髓。 This article deals with various issues in Candrakīrti’s theory of two truths that have not been addressed in detail by scholars. As the second of two articles, it deals with Candrakīrti’s association of svabhāva with conventional truth. According to Candrakīrti, the establishment of conventional truth is closely related to possession of svabhāva. Because reality for ordinary deluded people is formed by their attachments to what they mistakenly believe to be svabhāva, the Buddha explains that svabhāva is not real, but should be understood as conventional truth (saṃv?tisatya). In contrast with this, Candrakīrti also frequently states that svabhāva does not exist in either of the two truths. This article is an attempt to reconcile these two positions. As such, it analyzes Candrakīrti’s descriptions of the criteria for establishing conventional truth in the Madhyamakāvatāra-bhā?ya and Prasannapadā. It is found that because of svabhāva’s twofold relationship with conventional truth, the latter plays an important role in the establishment of a theory of truth, a theory of religious practice, and even of a theory of educational methods. As a result, the author finds that, rather than interpreting Candrakīrti’s theory of two truths from a perspective of discontinuity, if we regard it from a dynamic perspective in which it is complementary to the ultimate truth, we may gain a deeper understanding of the theory of two truths.
