According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, a subject who has freed himself from the bondage of individuality is necessarily compassionate, and his action, necessarily altruistic. This article explores the paradoxical aspects of this statement; for not only does it seem contradictory with the Pratyabhijñā’s non-dualism (how can compassion and altruism have any meaning if the various subjects are in fact a single, all-encompassing Self?)—it also implies a subtle shift in meaning as regards the very notion of compassion (karu?ā, kr?pā), since according to the two ?aivas, compassion does not result from the awareness of the others’ pain (du?kha)—as in Buddhism—but from the awareness of one’s own bliss (ānanda). The article thus shows that in spite of their radical criticism of traditional ethical categories such as meri (dharma) and demerit (adharma), the two ?aiva philosophers still make use of ethical categories, but not without pro- foundly transforming them.
