從天台宗《法華玄義》「本跡」詮釋方法上探討「指涉」的宗教哲學問題=The Issue of "Reference" in Religious Philosophy Reflected by the Hermeneutical Method of "Root and Traces" in the Profound Commentary on the Lotus Sutra
否定神學=Negative Theology; 天臺宗=Tiantai School; 解救學=Soteriology; 救度學; 救贖學; 符號學=Semiotics; 能指=Signifying; 所指=Signified; 本跡=Root and Traces; 聖凡不二=Non-Duality between/of the Sacred and Profane
摘要
依德國宗教學家G.. Mensching而言，諸世界宗教都展現為解救學（soteriology）的形式，並且皆具有兩種共同點︰一、解救學對於整個人類拯救之關懷，預設世俗生存之負面義；二、解救學以終極價值為展現，點出生存中之希望因素，也就是其拯救理想的正面義，後者由於不可被侵犯，故是神聖義。人類生存是否可有希望之跡象在於世俗界對神聖義之指涉。可是世俗之負面價值與神聖之正面價值之間存在著一個懸掛狀態，且該懸掛狀態會引發與符號學相關的問題︰既然現實世界體現世俗生存的負面形式，它怎麼還能夠指涉以終極價值為展現人類生存的神聖義？在諸世界宗教不同解救學傳統的脈絡中，世俗與神聖之間的指涉關係該如何被闡釋？換言之，現實世界中「能指」的符號與「所指」的神聖義之間的相對應，應該成為每一解救學脈絡所關注宗教符號學的哲學問題，該問題就屬於宗教哲學領域。筆者認為，基督天主教的否定神學(negative theology)以及佛教天台宗有關「本跡不二」的探討都會牽涉到該宗教符號學的哲學問題。比如公元500年否定神學家Dionysios Areopagita 於DeDivinis Nominibus 中吸收Proklos（485 年）所繼承新柏拉圖學派奠基人Plotin（270年）的符號學觀念，來解釋上帝與現實世界之間的關係。重點就在於現實世界當作上帝原型之副本形式，故兩者不相同一而只是相似；在存有上兩個作為不同的層次，兩個之間存在著一個鴻溝，因此否定神學神聖觀在於上帝存在之超越性，世俗與神聖間的關係主要受「人神相隔」的約。但是由於兩者之間有相似性，世俗界是寫照，上帝則是原形，前者反映出後者；換言之，世界是能指符號而上帝則是所指義。又因為寫照及原形之間的鴻溝，能指與所指非相同一，故所指終究是不可被指明而能指終究是所指的否定形態；Areopagita 就說，上帝就像在一切印記當中找不到而能印的圖章原形。該比喻就表示能指與所指之間關係就對應到否定神學神聖對世俗超越性的觀念。相對而言，佛學天台宗神聖觀順著類似「煩惱即菩提」之說法而強調，世俗與神聖之間具有兩極同體的關係，神聖義呈現為世俗界之逆相引導而世俗界之本質則是神聖的價值引導，能指的世俗界本來就是所指神聖義虛假的倒映形態。該呈現及本質之間具有相依相成一體兩面之構造，故能指世俗之「跡」回溯所指神聖之「本」；與否定神學之不同的是，能指世俗與所指神聖之同體並不代表在存有上兩個不同的領域。智者大師（538－597年）藉以植物的比喻來闡釋能指及所指兩極同體的關係︰「枝葉（＝跡）回溯根」與「根（＝本）使枝葉根植」，本跡彼此交涉之一體就等於能指與所指相依相成之構造。智者大師在《法華玄義》中繼續指出，只有在使眾生領悟佛法救度學能指之符號本來就具有「跡」身分時，該符號系統才能齊全地展現出其所指究竟義具有與「跡」身分相對而言之「本」身分，並且「本跡」同體之兩極雖互為敵對，但是兩極交互之同體還是作為「本」和「跡」所屬於的整體本身。因此天台宗「本跡」之二分法本來就代表天台宗在對佛法符號系統的反省中所使用的「一體兩門詮釋方法」，且形成《法華玄義》對佛法主要環節「本門十妙」及「跡門十妙」一體兩門的架構。在不同解救學傳統中就可以針對宗教符號學的哲學問題找到不同的答案。因此專就世俗與神聖之間的指涉關係而言，本研究計劃就列舉以上所提及兩種正好不同解救學的類型，來探討宗教符號學的哲學問題。筆者首先借用對照的方式，去區分西方神祕神學（＝否定神學）與東方天台宗佛學兩個解救學傳統針對神聖及世俗之間關係上的不同觀點。將兩種解救學類型之區分展現出來之後，在從兩個不同視野的角度上，筆者就進一步闡釋對於該宗教符號學哲學問題上兩種不同的解決方法。
According to the German scholar of Religious Studies G. Mensching, all world religions tend to take shape as soteriology, which always includes two issues they share in common: first, in its general ideal of saving all human beings, soteriology presupposes the negative value of profane existence; second, soteriology finds its expression in a system of ultimate value, which points to the factor of hope in human existence and represents its positive value; the latter is also the sacred because of its inviolability. Whether the world of human existence may indicate this hope relies on the reference of the profane to the sacred. However, there is a tension between the positive value of the sacred and negative value of the profane, which is closely related with a semiotic problem: If the world of human existence embodies a negative value, how can it still refer to the sacred finding its expression as ultimate value? How must be understood referential correlation between the sacred and profane in those concepts of various soteriological traditions of world religions? In other words, the correspondence between the signifying world of our existence and the signified sacred meaning must become a philosophical problem in religious semiotics which no type of soteriology can neglect; and this problem belongs to the field of religious philosophy. I would say that both the western tradition of negative theology and the Tiantai Buddhist speculations on ‘non-duality between traces and origin’ obviously point to this philosophical issue in religious semiotics. In De Divinis Nominibus Dionysios Areopagita appropriates Neoplatonic semiotics to explain the relationship between God and world; the world of our existence is a copy or shadow of the original of God, therefore the two are not identical but similar, which means that, ultimately, there is a gap between them; ontologically, the hierarchy of two levels of being – those of God and world – points to God’s transcendence. However, just because of their similarity, the world could be seen as an image, whereas God would be the original, the world depicts God. In other words, the world is the signifying sign and God the signified meaning. Again, because of the ontological gap between the signified and signifying, the two are not identical, and therefore, ultimately, the signified cannot
