This paper focuses on the debates on the two terms of time(kala, samaya) that recorded in Mahaprajñaparamitopadesa (hereafter abbreviated as MPPU). In this paper, I will take the debater cited the verses form Kala-Sutra as clues to investigate into the issue of time in the context of Indian philosophy, and try to figure out what philosophical problems are represented in the light of the context, further, to explore why MPPU criticized kala but samaya. Accordingly, I point out that the main criticism against kala is that this term tends toward realism, which is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrines of dependent co-arising (pratityasamutpada) and emptiness (sunyata). Moreover, the MPPU argues that samaya is a more appropriate term than kala, since it avoids this tendency towards realism. From the arguments presented in the text, it becomes clear that MPPU not only negates time as an objective reality, but even more so as an epistemic object. However, the MPPU still may not avoid the acceptance of time as a condition for the cognitive structure of conventional knowledge. Briefly, my conclusions are as follows, 1. Though lacking Sanskrit or Tibetan versions of the MPPU for comparative purposes, I have located verses from the Kala-Sutra cited in certain Indian philosophical texts. I confirm the existence of a number of similar verses and even corresponding verses in the Atharva Veda, Maitaya?iya Upani?ad, Mahabharata, and Sa? khya-Karika. The same verse, in Buddhist text, may be found in Candrakirti’s Prasannapada. Hence, this paper reveals a view of time based on the Brahmanical tradition in which it is considered a substance or the cause of all creations. Moreover, it reflects a metaphysical realist position. Although many scholars define a realist notion of time as a doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaise?ika, I suggest that this view might also be a stance of the Sarvastivada. 2. Most arguments in the MPPU follow the reductio ad absurdum form of argument (prasavga) or dilemma rule, which is consistent with Madhyamika reasoning. In addition, the debater’s arguments in the MPPU reflects a rich combination of philosophical backgrounds, hence if we were to examine the debates over the issue of time in a simple and explicit manner, it is quite possible that the debater might have been a Sarvastivadin. This paper points out that the view of time as designation or concept (prajñapti) in the MPPU merely avoids the objective reality of time, but it never denies the view of time as a pre-condition for the structure of knowledge. It also indicates that, in Buddhist philosophy, both the theory of momentariness in early Buddhism and the theory of time as designation in the Madhyamika system negated the view of time as a form of substantial metaphysics. Neither negated the instrumental meaning of time in conventional knowledge.