This article attempts to demonstrate the universality of philosophical significance in both the Vijñaptimātra-Tathāgatagarbha controversy between Huizao (648-714) and Fabao (627-705) in the late 7th century, on the one hand, and the Neo-Confucian debate between Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) in the 12th century, on the other hand. More surprisingly, the same pattern of hermeneutic conflict continued in East Asia from the 7th century down to the early 20th century. The debate between Lü Cheng (1896-1989) and Xiong Shili (1885-1968), which was centered upon the criticism of the Awakening of Faith ignited by Ouyang Jingwu and his school, is one of the most significance.In the beginning, the philosophical problem in the polemic is raised to spell out the conditions for attaining the Buddhahood. Two theories are developed in both the Buddhist and the Neo-Confucian to answer this problem. (1) The first theory, which takes a cognitive approach, contends that the condition for attaining the Buddhahood or sagehood is found in the mind which is capable of cognizing the truth. Truth is taken as the object of cognition, while mind is the subject of cognition. Truth is transcendent. Both Yogācāra and Zhu Xi hold this theory. (2) The second theory, which takes an ontological approach, holds that the condition for attaining the Buddhahood or sagehood is found in the subjectivity which is transcendentally grounded in truth. Truth is both transcendent and immanent. This theory even goes further to claim that mind is truth. This theory is held by both the Tathāgatagarbha School and Lu Xianshan.In the conclusion, I take an excursion to exercise a phenomenological reflection on the debate. The insight we obtain from phenomenology is that truth in formal logic should be also evidenced in eidetic intuition. That is, truth should not be separated from the experience of truth, which is possible only in the activity of mind.