P. Hugon (&) Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA), Austrian Academy of Sciences (OEAW), Apostelgasse 23, 1030 Vienna, Austria e-mail: Pascale.hugon@oeaw.ac.at
關鍵詞
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge; thal ʼgyur; prasaṅga; reductio ad absurdum; Argumentation; Consequence; Proof; Refutation; tshad ma; Buddhist epistemology
摘要
This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.
目次
Introduction 671 The Nature of “Consequences”: Consequences as a Type of Statement in a Disputation 675 The Function of Consequences 680 The Form of Consequence Statements 687 Conclusion: Can “Consequences” be Assimilated to reductio ad absurdum? 696
