Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal 'gyur) (2): The Analysis of the Correspondence between a Consequence and its Reverse Form and the Thirteenfold Typology of Consequences
This paper is part of a series of articles on the theory of argumentation proposed by the Tibetan thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), and in particular on his views on argumentation 'by consequence' (Tib. thal 'gyur/thal ba). I examine in detail the sections of Phya pa’s epistemological summary and of his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya that deal with the identification and definition of various kinds of consequences: fallacious consequences, genuine consequences and, among the latter, proving consequences and refuting consequences. I highlight the existence of two distinct frameworks in Phya pa’s discussion. In the first, Phya pa exclusively deals with consequences that fulfill a probative function. In the second, more extended framework, he establishes a thirteenfold typology of consequences that also includes consequences that fail to prove the proponent’s thesis but still succeed in refuting the opponent. I examine Phya pa’s criteria for proving consequences, and discuss the specific cases of consequences with a true conclusion and consequences with a true premise. I argue that the juxtaposition of the two frameworks reflects a gradual process of composition in which an earlier model was integrated and updated.
目次
Introduction 51 1. Phya pa on argumenation by consequence 53 1.1. Structure of the presentation of arguments by consequence in Phya pa's epistemological works 53 1.2. Background notions regarding Phya pa's views on argumentation 55 2. the correspondence between features of a proving consequence and features of its reverse form, the direct proof 59 2.1. Relevant features of the consequence and of the direct proof 59 2.2. Distinction between genuine and fallacious consequences 62 2.3. Exceptions 63 2.3.1. Failure of correspondence between "acceptance of the logical reason" (I) and "desire to know" (Ib') 64 2.3.2. Failure of correspondence between "pervasion" in the consequence (II) and in the reverse form (II') 66 2.3.3. What about the failure of correspondence between "elimination of the conclusion"(III) and "establishment of the qualification of the subject b the logical reason"(Ia')? 68 2.4. A precedent for the analysis of correspondence 69 3. phya pa's thirteenfold typology of consequences 72 3.1. Division criteria 74 3.1.1. Fulfillment of the premises from the point of view of the opponent 74 3.1.2. Establishment of the premises by a valid cognition 75 3.1.3. Elimination of the conclusion 76 (1) Elimination or invalidation by a valid cognition (tshad mas bsal pa, tshad mas bnod) - Nos. 5, 8, 11 76 (2) Elimination by the opponent's own words (rang tshig gis bsal pa) or by what the opponent accepts (khas blangs kyis bsal pa) (both expressions are used indifferently) - Nos. 6, 9, 12 77 (3) Absence of elimination (bsal ba med pa, bsal ba ye med pa, bsal ba gtan med pa) - Nos. 4, 7, 10, 13 77 3.2. Categories of consequences identified on the basis of the thirteenfold typology 77 3.2.1. Genuine and fallacious consequences 77 3.2.2. Probans-inducing and non-probans-inducing consequences 78 3.2.3. Additional criteria for probans-inducing consequences 80 (1) The establishment of the subject 80 (2) The establishment of negtive entailment 81 3.3. Definitions 81 3.3.1. Definition of fallacious and genuine consequences 82 3.3.2. Definition of non-probans-inducing and probans-inducing consequences 82 3.3.3. Aprevious definition of proving consequences criticized by Phya pa 84 4. The case of the true conclusion 85 4.1. Phya pa's position - A true conclusion cannot be eliminated 85 4.2. A true conclusion can be eliminated - The fourteenfold typology of Phya pa's successors 89 4.3. gTsang nag pa's middle way 91 5. The case of true premises 94 6. Conclusion: Remarks on the constitution of the text 99 Acknowledgments 104 Bibliography and abbreviations 104 Sanskrit works 104 Tibetan works 105 modern studies 106 Appendix: Phya pa on non-instantiated logical reasons 107 ABSTRACT 112
