『倶舎論』とその諸註釈における三世実有論批判の研究 (1) — 仏教の時間論 —=The Sautrāntika Critique of the Sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real-Existence of Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Its Commentaries (1): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories
This essay is a study of positions of the “Anuśayanirdeśa” section of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhās. ya (hereafter AKBh) and other Indian commentaries on that text, which introduce the Sarvāstivādin theory of traikālyavāda (the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods) and Sautrantika critiques against it. In the “Anuśayanirdeśa,” the following topics are discussed. Sarvāstivādins maintain that the existence of conditioned dharmas, which are the factors composing the world in the three time periods of past, present, and future, is real and permanent. In order to explain the validity of their understanding, they develop various theories to distinguish these dharmas existences in the three different time periods. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the Buddhist principle of the momentariness of the existence of dharmas (sarvasamskrtam anityam) is explained by making distinctions among the three time periods. Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva are representative proponents of this theory of the three time periods. Among these Sarvāstivādin scholars, Vasumitra’s interpretation was, eventually accepted as the most accurate understanding of the theory. According to Vasumitra, time itself does not actually exist. Rather, it expresses the existence of the future-place that is the state of potentiality as future time, the present-place in which real dharmas actualize externally and momentarily, and the past-place in which dharmas that have completed their momentary actualization exist nominally in potential-state. Vasumitra explains the passing of time as the process of dharmas passing from the future-place to the present-place, and then to the past-place. He also explains the movement of dharmas in the timeplaces through the existence or non-existence of their activities. The future dharmas have not yet had activities. The present dharmas have activities. Dharmas that do not yet have activity are future dharmas; those with activities are present dharmas; and those whose activities have been completed are past dharmas. This Sarvativādin explanation of the traikālyavāda was, however, refuted by Vasubandhu as a Sautrantika scholar who points out the contradiction in this theory that explains the activities of dharmas as momentary while maintaining that their existence is permanent. The Sarvāstivādins recognize the existence of past and future ¯ dharmas, based on their arguments on two scriptural proofs and two analytical reasons. Their explanations can be summarized in the following three points: (1) objects of cognition exist really; (2) when consciousness (vijñāna) arises, sensory faculties (indriya) and the objects of cognition (viṣaya) must exist as real causes; and (3) actions (karmas) produce their effects. Vasubandhu, as a Sautrantika scholar, further refutes the Sarvāstivādins by presenting the proofs: (1) that non-existing objects, or nominal existents (prajñapti-sat), can become the objects of cognition; (2) that future-objects (visaya) cannot become the valid cause for the arising of consciousness (vijñāna); and (3) that the manifestation of the effects of actions (karmas) at a particular time cannot be explained if the action in the past is a permanent existence. From this Sautrantika position, Vasubandhu maintains that dharmas exist only in the present time. Only present dharmas, which appear and perish momentarily, are real existences. Past and future dharmas are potential seeds that have “once existed” or “will exist” and that have accumulated in the present dharmas through perfuming. This is how the distinction between past, present, and future can be established. Sarvāstivādins explain that past actions (karmas) produce effects because of the real-existence of actions in a past time. On the other hand, Sautrantikas understand that an action that took place in the past does not currently exist in the past time. Instead, past actions exist as perfumed seeds in the continuum of succession of present
