『倶舎論』とその諸註釈における三世実有論批判の研究 (2) — 仏教の時間論 —=The Sautrāntika Critique of the Sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real-Existence of Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Its Commentaries (2): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories
This paper is a continuation of “The Sautrāntika Critique of the Sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real Existence of Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Its Commentaries (1): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories” published in the Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 15 (2011). This paper continues the examination of the Sautrāntika critique of the Sarvāstivādin theory of the real existence of dharmas in the three time periods. The Sautrantika critique is found in the Anuśayanirdeśa chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The Sautrāntikas criticize the scriptural proofs presented by the Sarvāstivādins. The first proof concerns the Sarvāstivādin position that, because objects of mental cognition exist, we are indifferent to or attached to those objects. While this is a problem of an epistemological perspective, the Sautrantikas criticize the Sarvāstivādins by pointing out that their arguments are cast from an ¯ ontological perspective. The Sautrantikas point out that the existence of past and future dharmas is posited in order to explain causal relationships to those who reject the theory of causation. It is not that past and future dharmas really exist; they merely exist nominally as memories and possibilities in present dharmas. The Sautrantikas’ criticism of the Sarvāstivādins’ second scriptural proof concerns the Sarvāstivādin idea that consciousness arises depending on the sense faculty and object. Since they believe that past and future objects are real existents, they maintain that consciousness arises depending upon them. The Sautrantikas criticize the Sarvāstivādins by pointing out that it is not proper to say that future dharmas can be the cause of a present mental consciousness that arises before future dharmas come to exist. For the Sarvāstivādins, dharmas in the future position can be the cause of dharmas at the present point because they understand time like space. For the Sautrantikas, however, ¯ past and future dharmas are nothing but nominal seed-like existents. Both Vasubandhu as a Sautrantika, and Saṃghabhadra, a Sarvāstivādin, agree that future dharmas can be cognitive objects for buddhas who possess pure, clean and transcendent knowledge. But what each of them means is different. Vasubandhu means that buddhas can correctly pre-recognize the seeds of the present dharmas that have yet to arise. Sam. ghabhadra, on the other hand, means that only buddhas can know which dharmas in the future position will come to the present point.
