『倶舎論』とその諸註釈における三世実有論批判の研究 (3) — 仏教の時間論 —=The Sautrāntika Critique of the Sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real-Existence of Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Its Commentaries (3): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories
This essay is the third and final part of my study on the Sautrāntika critique of the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods. Previously published essays are “The Sautrantika Critique of the sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real-Existence of Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Its Commentaries (1): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories”(Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 15 [2011]), and “The Sautrantika Critique of the Sarvāstivādin Theory of the Real-Existence of ¯ Dharmas in the Three Time Periods as Found in the Abhidharmakośabhās. ya and Its Commentaries (2): A Study of Buddhist Time Theories”(Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 16 [2012]). I have also published two essays in relationship with these essays, “Debates on the Concept of Function (kāritra) in the Abhidharmakośa and Its Com mentaries: A Japanese Translation“ (Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 11 [2007]), and “A Study of the Concepts of trayodaśam. āyatana (the Thirteenth Base) and the ‘Sound Which is Not Heard’in the Time Theory of the Abhidharmakośabhās. ya”(The Studies in Buddhism 64 [2008]).“ This essay begins with the last part of the Sautrantika critique against the Sarvāstivādins’ second ¯ proof (doctrinal proof) of the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods. Sarvāstivādins maintain that, doctrinally speaking, past and future dharmas are real existences because cognition of them arises depending on two factors, the sensory faculty and objects. However, Sautrantikas counter that not only existing objects but also non-existing objects can be the objects of cognition. They make the distinction that bodhisattvas see existing objects as existing and non-existing objects as non-existing, while ordinary persons (prthagjanas) mistakenly see non-existing objects as existing. Thus non-existing objects mistakenly cognized as existing by ordinary persons are objects of false cognitions. Next, I introduce the Sautrantika critique of the Sarvāstivādins’ third proof (the first logical proof). Sarvāstivādins maintain that, logically speaking, past and future dharmas are real existences because our cognition cognizes existing objects. Sthiramati, however, in his commentaries, proves that there are no real objects that fulfill the two Sautrantika conditions as posited by Dignaga that (1) objects are the causes of cognition, and (2) objects have the same appearance as cognition. Finally I discuss the Sautrantika critique of the Sarvāstivādins’ fourth proof (the second logical proof). Sarvāstivādins maintain that, logically speaking, past and future dharmas are real existences because, based on the effects of karmas, past and future karmas exist. Vasubandhu’s criticism is that effects are not produced by past karmas. Furthermore, Yasomitra maintains that ´ effects produced as the results of a continuum of successive mental cognitions of the specific present dharma bodies arisen as the effects of preceding past karmas. However, if past and future karmas are real existences, the effects of these karmas must exist permanently. And, in that case, we could not explain logically how karmas mature and give effects at specific times. In conclusion, I will also introduce additional issues related to criticisms of the theory of the realexistence of dharmas in the three time periods taken up in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and its commentaries
