YE Shaoyong is Associate Professor of Sanskrit Language and Buddhist Literature at Peking University, China.
關鍵詞
Two Truths; Middle Position; Madhyamaka; Nāgārjuna; Bhāviveka
摘要
The two truths theory is usually considered as an indispensable framework for Madhyamaka exponents to maintain a middle position. Based on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MK) and its Indic commentaries, this paper challenges this view and argues that there is a discernible turning point in the exegetic history of the MK concerning the two truths theory and that the practice of establishing the middle position on two truths was not present in the Madhyamaka tradition until Bhāviveka of the sixth century. In MK 24.10, Nāgārjuna affirms the pedagogical value of the mechanism of conventional conceptualization by asserting that paramārtha has to be taught through the media of vyavahāra. Nevertheless, he explicitly denies all kinds of customary categories, which are the content of conventional truth. Moreover, Nāgārjuna defines the extreme of nonexistence as a view founded on the false presupposition of existence, i.e., a view committed to the position that things previously exist and then perish. Hence, he establishes his middle position free from both extremes simply through a negation against the presupposition of existence, rather than by any dichotomic arguments. The Akutobhayā and Buddhapālita’s commentary align with this stance and further equate the middle position to paramārtha. The practice of combining the middle position with two truths theory had not been introduced into the Madhyamaka tradition until Bhāviveka, who admitted practical existence at the conventional level to secure a middle position. Such a practice was later adopted by Candrakīrti, and eventually became the standard explanation of the middle position in the Madhyamaka tradition.
