This paper is the fourth part of an annotated Japanese translation of Louis de la Valée Poussin’s French translation of Nyāyānusāra pp.68-87 (Taisho 29, pp.630-632), an Abhidharma text discussing the Sarvāstivādin theory of the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods.
In this part, following the examination of the first scriptural proof of the Sarvāstivādin theory of the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods in the previous section, Saṃghabhadra examines the second scriptural proof, which is the theory that consciousness arises from sense faculties and sense objects. According to Sautrāntikas, for example, since the faculty of “mental sense” and a subsequently produced “cognition” belong to the same continuum of “mind,” the arising of “cognition” is explained. However, Saṃghabhadra objects that the dharmas as sense objects do not belong to the same continuum as mind: since eyes as a sense faculty and visible objects are both materialistic, and visual consciousness is mental, they cannot belong to the same continuum. Therefore, the Sautrāntikas’ understanding of cognition based on a theory of continuum theory breaks down. For Saṃghabhadra, because dharmas destined to arise in the distant future are not spatially separated from dharmas arising soon, the former can generate cognition as object and support.
Next, Saṃghabhadra examines the first logical proof of the theory of the real-existence of dharmas in the three time periods, which is the idea that consciousness arises because it possesses objects with real existence. The Sthavira maintains that, in the successive arising of causes and effects, past cognitions and past cognized objects continuously leave pūrvānudhātu (old subsidiary karmic elements) in the continuum, which explains the arising of cognition in the present time. Saṃghabhadra criticizes this theory by pointing out that objects which were not cognized in the past, or those to be cognized in the future, cannot be cognized as anudhātu (subsidiary karmic elements) in the present time.
Next Saṃghabhadra examines the second logical proof by the Sautrāntika that past and future dharmas are real existences, because past karmas produce future results. Sautrāntikas, seeing the continuum of actions in the same light as the continuum of mind, explain karma as a process of special transformation of the continuum, here using the metaphor that seeds of plants produce fruits. Sam. ghabhadra criticizes this theory by maintaining that, although the continuum of plants is one and occurs sequentially, the continuum of manas-karmas (mental actions =caitta =cetanā [volition]) and the continuum of mind are different. Therefore, they cannot be explained by using the metaphor of plants.
At the end of this section, Saṃghabhadra also includes miscellaneous arguments about the real-existence of past and future dharmas.
