In Indian Mahayana Buddhism, the vows of the bodhisattvas were codi-fied according to two systems. The first is called “mind only” or “vast conduct” and is said to go back to Maitreya Buddha and Asaṅga (ca. 320– ca. 390). The second is called the “middle way” or “profound view” and is said to go back to Mañjugoṣa Bodhisattva and Nāgārjuna (fl. ca. 2nd–3rd c.). In this way, people ascribe the Bodhisattvabhūmi of Asaṅga and the Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka of Ācārya Candragomin (fl. 5th c.) to the Mind Only system and the Śikṣāsamuccaya and Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva (ca. late 7th–mid 8th c.) to the Middle Way system. The two systems differ in some ways and provide different lists of the actual vows, but the present essay is not directly concerned with the vows proper, but rather with how Buddhists have interpreted these vows and how such interpretations are influenced by or interact with other aspects of Buddhism. As the title of this essay suggests, the primary focus is on the precept of not killing and how this is affected by and interacts with such notions as karma, skillful means, and compassion in the different interpretations. The developments that I describe here for Indian Buddhism should be seen as a parallel to what Ulrich Pagel established in his study of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. He observed an early phase of Mahayana sutras where śrāvaka morality is still the greatest influence on the bodhisattvas’ disciplined conduct. Later, however, the idea of a special code of conduct for bodhisattvas was increasingly adapted to the newly developing ideal of benefitting all sentient beings and to a new way of viewing reality as characterized chiefly by non-duality. These new developments led to a gradual devaluation of the śrāvaka type of morality passion. Whether such an exegesis of the Buddha’s teachings is correct, as Damien Keown2 doubts, is not the point. For my discussion in the later sections of this essay, I am chiefly interested in the fact that some Mahayana texts seem to override the axiomatic settings of the earlier sources and in how they either skirt or address that problem. Moreover, awareness of this ancient exegetical background is also necessary to be able to fully appreciate the efforts of the Tibetan author that I will introduce later. Let me now briefly summarize Gethin’s findings.
目次
KILLING IN PALI SOURCES 148 Pali Suttas 149 Commentaries and Pali Abhidhamma 149 KILLING IN MAHAYANA SOURCES 151 The Upāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra 151 The Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra 154 The Bodhisattvabhūmi 156 FRUITION OR NO FRUITION? 158 A TIBETAN SOLUTION 161 If It Is a Transgression, It Must Comprise Affliction 161 Faults and Permissions 164 “Unmixed Results” 167 Skillful in All Respects 169 Three Levels of Bodhisattva Practice 170 CONCLUSION 173
