This paper reconsiders the opinion claimed by Shōryū Katsura(桂紹隆) that the Dignāga system of logic does not contain negative proposition. The Chinese hetuvidyā materials strongly contradicts Katsura’s interpretation, which I will try to show by analysing the interpretation and further application of “anupalabdhi (nonperception)”-hetu by Chinese and Japanese monks. There are three focal points discussed in this paper. First is the difference in the interpretation of anupalabdhi-hetu between Chinese monks and Dharmakrīti. Second is the question of whether this type of hetu should be considered as “perception” or as “inference” [i.e. direct non-cognitive act of knowledge or indirect cognitive act of knowledge]. Third is the definition of this hetu and under what situations can it be applied as an acceptable hetu in logical syllogism. To answer the above focal points, I will analyze three Chinese Buddhist works that discuss the nature and application of anupalabdhi-hetu. The materials analyzed in this paper are not arranged in chronological order, rather, they are arranged based on the similarity of views of their authors concerning the concept of anupalabdhi. Therefore, since Zenju’s(善珠) opinion is different from histeacher, Huizhao(慧沼), I will discuss his works first. The views expressed by Huizhao and Shentai(神泰) are more similar and therefore I have grouped them together. The concept of anupalabdhi-hetu has a long history of development in the Chinese Buddhist scholastic system, bringing forth different opinions on its proper definition and scope of application. Zenju combined the logical concept of “negation”(遮) and “affirmation”(表) and limited the scope of anupalabdhi to exclude its use in the positive proposition. Therefore, according to Zenju, anupalabdhi-hetu could be used as a proper logical reason if, and only if, being limited to a simple negation. According to him, anupalabdhi-hetu can only support the concept of “emptiness” or “non-existence”, which are conceptual objects without any ontological basis. However, Zenju’s understanding of anupalabdhihetu should not be considered as a kind of simple “nominal construction”. It can be argued that in his understanding of anupalabdhi, Zenju included not only “inference”, but also the “direct perception” aspect into it. And this idea is also shared in Kuiji’s(窺基) understanding of anupalabdhi-hetu – [that which cannot be obtained by perception or inference] – as an acceptable formal type of hetu. Huizhao and Shentai’s concept of anupalabdhi-hetu are consistent with each other. They both focus on how to apply anupalabdhi-hetu to the situation of “empty subject terms”, that is, they analyze how dharmin, which is nonexistent, can be what anupalabdhi-hetu refers to. In short, both of them consider this hetu as a kind of “nominal construction”. Huizhao claims that dharmin should be regarded as existent if it is established in the “existent proposition”(有體宗) and its specifier should be understood as an
